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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal
Circuit") was created by Congress through the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982.' Congress created the Federal Circuit, in part, to
establish nationwide uniformity in patent law. The Federal Circuit was
seen as a mechanism to provide uniform interpretation of patent law and
patent policy-a necessary alternative to the inconsistent application of
patent law at the time by the regional circuit courts. In order to achieve
this goal, Congress drafted 35 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) to give the Federal
Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over "an appeal from a final decision of a
district court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction of that court was
based, in whole or in part," on 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Section 1338(a) pro-
vides, in part, that district courts shall have original jurisdiction over
"any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents
From 35 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), the appellate jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit over patent claims was born. While § 1295(a), in
combination with § 1338, defined the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction, Congress left the specific boundaries of the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction to be decided by the courts. Over its lifetime, the
Federal Circuit, regional circuits, and the Supreme Court have spoken to
the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. Based on this case law, the
1. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
"Arising Under"
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over appeals evolved to include cases
wherein at least one claim was based on a patent law cause of action and
cases whose resolution necessarily depended on answering a substantial
question of patent law. The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction included cases
with patent law claims in the complaint, as well as in counterclaims. The
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction also encompassed cases that were
consolidated with cases containing patent law claims. Even in
circumstances in which the only patent law claim was dismissed, the
Federal Circuit exercised exclusive jurisdiction over any appeal from the
case as long as the dismissal of the patent law claim was with prejudice.
The law governing the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction was
brought into question in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Circulation Sys-
2tems, Inc. The Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over Vornado's
appeal rested solely on Vornado's counterclaim alleging patent infringe-
ment by Holmes.3 Holmes's complaint sought a declaratory judgment of
no trade dress infringement and did not include any patent law claims.4
While the Federal Circuit found appellate jurisdiction over Vornado's
appeal based on the counterclaim of patent infringement, the Supreme
Court disagreed! The Court focused on the language in 35 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a), which defines the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction by
the statute's reference in 35 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 6 The Court indicated
that the "arising under" language in § 1338(a) invokes the well-pleaded
complaint rule.7 The Court noted that the well pleaded complaint rule
provides that whether a case "aris[es] under" federal law, or in this case
patent law, must be determined from the plaintiff's complaint.8 The
Court therefore concluded that a counterclaim, such as Vornado's, did
not "aris[e] under" patent law because it was not contained within the
plaintiff's, in this case Holmes's, complaint, and thus could not give the
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction. 9
The Court's holding in Holmes stated that the Federal Circuit's ap-
pellate jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule and
specifically rejected counterclaims as a vehicle to vesting appellate ju-
risdiction with the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court's decision opens
the door for claims of patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, and
other patent law claims, to be reviewed by regional circuits, instead of
2. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002).
3. Id. at 1893.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Holmes,
concluding that "[n]ot all cases involving a patent-law claim fall within
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction."'0 As Justice Stevens noted in his con-
currence, the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes will have even a
greater impact on patent law, allowing "other circuits [to] have some role
to play in the development of [patent] law."" The impact of Holmes may
also be felt with respect to a federal district court's removal jurisdiction
over patent counterclaims. The Indiana Supreme Court has already ap-
plied Holmes in the state court context in Green v. Hendrickson
Publishers, Inc.,12 involving a copyright claim-whose federal jurisdic-
tion is also defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1338. State courts may now decide
patent law claims, based on the Holmes decision, because such claims do
not "aris[e] under" the patent laws, within the meaning of § 1338, and
therefore cannot give a federal district court removal jurisdiction.
The door is clearly open for the possible development of substantive
patent law outside of the hands of the Federal Circuit and, even more
significant, outside of the federal courts. The very uniformity Congress
attempted to introduce through its creation of the Federal Circuit may
become undone by the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1295(a)(1)
and § 1338(a) in Holmes. The Holmes decision may very well plant the
seeds for the growth of non-uniformity in patent law.
To what extent significant patent law developments will occur out-
side the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction will hinge on two crucial
developments post-Holmes:
First, both federal and state courts will need to determine the effects
of the rule of law established in Holmes. More particularly, courts will
decide under what circumstances a patent law claim is properly appealed
to the applicable regional circuit instead of the Federal Circuit. In addi-
tion, courts will also have to decide whether patent claims can stay in
state court and outside the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. Ques-
tions that Holmes presents include: (1) What specific types of cases does
Holmes take out of the Federal Circuit's hands? (2) Does -this universe of
cases represent a significant portion of all litigated cases including patent
law claims? (3) In addition, will the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes
affect the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over cases where patent law
claims have been added to or dismissed before and after appeal? (4) Fur-
thermore, will federal district courts lose original and exclusive
jurisdiction over patent law claims due to the holding in Holmes?
(5) And, finally, will the decision in Holmes be used by a significant
10. Id. at 1895.
11. Id. at 1898.
12. Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. 2002).
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number of practitioners to craft complaints in such a way so as to avoid
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction or even federal district court origi-
nal jurisdiction?
Second, once cases including patent law claims are appealed to a re-
gional circuit, or stay in a state court, the question becomes whether
Federal Circuit law will still control those cases. The potential for non-
uniform development of patent law will, at that point, hinge on the
"choice of law" rules adopted by regional circuits and state courts when
deciding patent law issues. The choice of law questions presented by
Holmes include: (1) Will regional circuits and state courts choose to be
controlled by Federal Circuit law or their own regional circuit or state
law when deciding patent law claims? (2) Even for those courts that
adopt Federal Circuit law as controlling law on patent issues, how will
these courts approach unsettled questions of patent law-will the re-
gional circuits and state courts try to answer unsettled questions as the
Federal Circuit would or will they look to earlier law of their own, or
will they chose to answer the question de novo?
If regional circuits and state courts begin to apply their own patent
law, as opposed to following established Federal Circuit law, certain pat-
ent law issues that were once decided by the Federal Circuit will be
reopened. Such reopened patent law issues may not even be decided at
the federal level, with state courts playing an active role in the develop-
ment of federal patent law. The Supreme Court will be placed, as it was
before the creation of the Federal Circuit, in the position of being the
only Court that can assure uniformity in the field of patent law, a field
Congress has already recognized is uniquely suited for, and indeed
needy of, homogeneity.
The Supreme Court's decision in Holmes presents significant ques-
tions about the scope of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction and
the removal and exclusive jurisdiction of federal district courts over pat-
ent law claims. This uncertainty threatens the uniformity in patent law
that the Federal Circuit was charged with creating. This Article addresses
these questions and concludes that the potential for non-uniformity re-
sulting from the ruling in Holmes is real. The rationale underlying the
Holmes decision will divert patent law counterclaims from the federal
judicial system, not just the Federal Circuit's appellate review. In addi-
tion, situations will likely arise where regional circuits revisit issues
already decided by the Federal Circuit in light of the circuit's pre-1982
case law. A body of state law on patent issues may also be developed.
To prevent these situations from occurring, the effect of Holmes on
the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction must be limited and regional
circuits and state courts must look to the Federal Circuit for guidance on
Spring 2003]
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patent law issues. Just as the Federal Circuit gives proper deference to
regional circuit decisions on non-patent law issues, regional circuits and
state courts should give deference to the Federal Circuit on issues related
to patent law. Additionally, legislative responses could provide an abso-
lute solution to the problem presented by Holmes. Congress can amend
§ 1295(a) and § 1338 to return the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdic-
tion, and federal district court jurisdiction, to its state before Holmes.
This would ensure, even post-Holmes, that patent law claims are litigated
at the federal level and reviewed by the Federal Circuit.
This Article reaches these conclusions in the following manner. Part
I of this Article begins by looking at the creation of the Federal Circuit,
including the reasons Congress created a specialized appellate court for
patent law. Part I proceeds to examine the development of the case law
that defined the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over patent law
claims, up to the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes. Part II of this
Article examines, in-depth, the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes.
Part III attempts to further define the specific types of cases that
must, under Holmes, be appealed to a regional circuit as opposed to be-
ing appealed to the Federal Circuit. The effect of Holmes on federal
district court removal and exclusive jurisdiction over patent law claims
will also be examined. To provide an empirical prospective, published
Federal Circuit cases, since the Federal Circuit's inception in 1982, will
be reviewed to determine which of these cases would, under the Holmes
decision, have gone to the regional circuit or stayed in state court. Part
III also discusses the "choice of law" rules that regional circuits and state
courts may adopt to handle the patent law claims they will review or de-
cide. Part III also examines the non-uniformity and conflicts that will be
created if regional circuits and state courts ignore the Federal Circuit's
case law and begin to develop their own, independent precedent on pat-
ent issues. Part III takes as an example specific areas of patent law, such
as the patentability of business method patents, and looks to how differ-
ent regional circuits and state courts may treat these patent law issues.
Part IV focuses on the non-uniformity that the holding in Holmes
creates. In particular, Part IV investigates the harm the result of Holmes
will have on doctrinal stability and horizontal equity in patent law. Fi-
nally, Part V presents potential solutions to prevent this breach of
uniformity in patent law post-Holmes, suggesting that regional circuits
and state courts observe Federal Circuit law as controlling on patent law
claims and that, in order to truly preserve patent law uniformity, legisla-
tion must be passed to restore the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction,
and federal district court exclusive jurisdiction, to where it stood before
the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JURISDICTION
OVER PATENT CASES PRIOR TO HOLMES
A. Creation of the Federal Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was cre-
ated by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.13 The Federal
Circuit was formed in response to a perceived crisis in the federal courts
system, and, more particularly, in the judicial handling and development of
patent law.'4 Prior to the Federal Circuit, patent cases, while within the
original jurisdiction of the federal district courts,' 5 were appealed to the
appropriate regional circuit. 6 Certain patent issues could also be decided
by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), which had exclu-
sive jurisdiction over appeals from decisions made by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). 7 The CCPA did not have appel-
late review jurisdiction over claims of patent infringement filed in district
court, leaving the decisions on patent enforcement to be made by regional
circuits. With this division in labor between the CCPA and regional cir-
cuits, regional circuit decisions on patent law issues were differing greatly
from those of the CCPA and the USPTO. 8
Further division on patent law issues arose amongst the regional
circuits. The handling of patent appeals by multiple circuits led to circuit
splits on different patent law issues.' 9 In addition, certain regional circuits
gained a reputation as being pro-patentee, while other circuits were
13. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22-23 (1981); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5-6 (1981), re-
printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15-16; Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedure: Recommendations for Change, reprinted
in 67 F.R.D. 195, 214, 361-76 (1975) [hereinafter "Hruska Commission"]. See also Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 6-8 (1989); Emmette F. Hale, III, The "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit:
An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 238-42 (1986);
Thomas H. Case & Scott R. Miller, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301, 301 (1984).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1980).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1980) (indicating that, prior to the creation of the Federal Cir-
cuit, patent cases appealed from district courts went to regional circuits). See also H.R. REP.
No. 97-312, at 22-24 (1981).
17. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22-24 (1981) (also noting that patent issues could be de-
cided by the Court of Claims).
18. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (noting that the there was
"a notorious difference between the standards [of patentability] applied by the Patent Office
and by the courts").
19. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 23-24 (1981); Hruska Commission, 67 F.R.D. 195 at
361-76 (1975).
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perceived as being patent unfriendly. 20 To make matters worse, the
Supreme Court's docket was overloaded, and the number of patent cases
granted cert was dwindling.2' The CCPA, while a central location for all
appeals from PTO administrative decisions, had little to no influence on
the decisions of the regional circuit on non-administrative patent issues.2
The handling of patent appeals by regional circuits, coupled with the
Supreme Court's inability to resolve any conflicts amongst the circuits due
to docket overload, created a lack of uniformity in patent law across the
United States.23 The fact that certain circuits were both doctrinally and
statistically beneficial for the alleged infringer, while others were not, led
to forum shopping by patentees and alleged infringers.24 A race to the
courthouse between these two parties was common, each trying to file its
case first in the forum most favorable to them.25 This lack of uniformity
and forum shopping caused the technology community to lose faith in the
patent system, leading to a devaluation of patents.26 The lack of certainty
and predictability in patent law hampered technological growth,
innovation, research, and business planning.27
In the early 1980s, Congress set out to remedy the problems in the
patent system. The Hruska Commission, which studied the caseload crisis
in the federal courts, suggested a patent court that sat between the regional
circuits and the Supreme Court.28 Congress relied on the results of the
Commission's study but adopted a different solution--creating a single
forum for hearing patent appeals, both from district courts and the
USPTO, sitting at the same level as other regional courts.29 The court,
named the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, would,
in addition to other areas of appellate jurisdiction, assume the jurisdiction
of the CCPA and obtain jurisdiction over appeals of from patent cases be-
20. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22-23 (1981) (noting that some circuits were consid-
ered "pro-patent" and others "anti-patent"); Hruska Commission, 67 F.R.D. at 370 (1975)(noting that "patentees now scramble to get into the 5th, 6th, and 7th circuits since the courts
there are not inhospitable to patents whereas infringers scramble to get anywhere but in these
Circuits"). See also Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 6-7.
21. See Hruska Commission, 67 F.R.D. 195, 217-20 (1975).
22. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 6.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22-23 (1981); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 4-5 (1981), re-
printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14-15.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 23-26 (1981); Hruska Commission, 67 F.R.D. 195,370
(1975).
25. Id.; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 6-7; Hale, supra note 14, at 239-40.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 24-25 (1981); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15; Hruska Commission, 67 ER.D. 195, 361-76 (1975).
27. Id.
28. Hruska Commission, 67 F.R.D. 195, 236-47 (1975); Case and Miller, supra note 14,
at 302.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22-27 (1981); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 4-6 (1981), re-
printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14-16.
"Arising Under"
fore federal district courts." Congress believed that the Federal Circuit,
being "[a] single court of appeals for patent cases[,] will promote certainty
where it is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not eliminate,
the forum-shopping that now occurs.
31
B. Statutory Basis for the Federal
Circuit's Appellate Jurisdiction
Congress defined the scope of the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdic-
tion over patent appeals from district courts through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1). The Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over district court
patent cases32 is based on § 1295(a)(1) jointly interpreted with the patent
jurisdiction statute for district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 33 Section
1295(a)(1) reads, in relevant part:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
have exclusive jurisdiction-( 1) of an appeal from a final decision
of a district court.., if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in
whole or in part, on section 1338 of [28 U.S.C.], except that a
case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress, relating
to copyrights, exclusive rights in mask works, or trademarks and
no other claim under section 1338(a) shall be governed by sec-
tions 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title.34
As noted in the language of § 1295(a)(1), the Federal Circuit
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a final district court decision
as long as the district court's jurisdiction "was based, in whole
or in part, on" patent jurisdiction defined in "section 1338.",
3
30. Id.
31. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 25 (citing Hruska Commission, 67 F.R.D. at 625, 628); see
also S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15 (noting that the
establishment of the court of appeals for the Federal Circuit also provides a forum that will
increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law).
32. In addition to district courts of the United States, § 1295(a)(1) also gives the Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over patent appeals from "the United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the
District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands."
33. Section 1295 also defines the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over subject matter other
then patent appeals from district courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2-14),(b), (c) (1994).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994).
35. Congress specifically drafted § 1295(a)(1) to "give[] the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit jurisdiction of any appeal in which the trial court jurisdiction was based, in
whole or in part, on section 1338 of title 28 (which as stated above confers on the district court
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks), except that jurisdiction of an appeal in a
case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress related to copyrights or trademarks,
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Section 133836 reads, in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such juris-
diction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent,
plant variety protection and copyright cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with
a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant
variety protection or trademark laws.37
These two statutes-35 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338, linked together
by the language in § 1295(a)(1), define the Federal Circuit's "exclusive"
appellate jurisdiction over patent appeals from district court final deci-
sions. Notably, the jurisdiction over patent cases for both the Federal
Circuit and federal district courts is tied to § 1338. Both § 1295(a)(1)
and § 1338(a) use a legally significant phrase, "arising under," to define
those cases that the Federal Circuit and federal district courts have juris-
diction over. Congress emphasized the "arising under" language of the
statutes, noting that "[c]ases will be within the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the same sense that cases are said to
'arise under' federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. 38
C. "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
The phrase "arising under" originated from Article III of the Consti-
tution, defining the jurisdiction of the federal court system.39 This
constitutional grant extends federal judiciary power to every case in
which federal law potentially forms an ingredient of the claim.40 Article
and no other claims under section 1338(a) will continue to go to the regional appellate courts,
pursuant to 1294 of title 28." H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 41 (1981). "[T]he statutory language in
question requires that the district court have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1338" S. REP. No.
97-275, at 19 (1981). The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have also observed that
§ 1295(a)(1), as drafted, defines the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction with reference the
district court's jurisdiction over the case on appeal. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1988); Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1428-
30 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
36. Section 1338(c), not shown, was added in 1998 by Pub. L. 105-304 to equate a dis-
trict court's jurisdiction over rights in mask works with those defined in parts (a) and (b) of the
statute with regards to copyrights.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a),(b) (1994).
38. H.R. REaP. No. 97-312, at 41 (1981).
39. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added).
40. Osbom v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-27 (1824).
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III allowed "[t]he mere existence of a latent federal 'ingredient' that
might in theory be dispositive of the outcome of a case ... to bring the
entire case, including ancillary nonfederal issues, within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts."4 The power conferred by Article III, however,
cannot be exercised by lower federal courts without an implementing
statute allowing such courts to use some or all of this constitutional grant
of jurisdiction. 2
Such a statutory grant is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which states
that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.4 3
Case law has established that this statutory grant of judicial power is
considerably narrower than that provided by the Constitution." The Su-
preme Court has provided a test to determine whether a case falls within
the "arising under" jurisdiction defined by § 1331 that has both a proce-
dural and substantive component.
1. Step One to Determining "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
The first step ("Step One") in defining "arising under" jurisdiction
consists of an "analytical filter ' 45 termed the "well-pleaded complaint
rule. 4 6 "The first step dictates" where, i.e., in which pleading or paper,
"the jurisdiction-conferring federal question must appear," limiting the
scope of where "arising under" jurisdiction can be found.47 The well-
pleaded complaint rule, Step One, is set forth below:
[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law
or treaty of the United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional
statute, ... must be determined from what necessarily appears in
the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declara-
tion, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of
defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose. a
Case law prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes places a
defense based on federal law outside the lens of the well-pleaded
41. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When does what
'Arise Under'Federal Law?, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1829, 1832-33 (June 1998) (citing Osborn, 22
U.S. at 823).
42. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (emphasis added).
44. Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 at n.8
(1983).
45. Oakley, supra note 41, at 1834.
46. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127 (1974) (per curiam).
47. Oakley, supra note 41, at 1834-35.
48. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76
(1914)).
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complaint. 9 In addition, parts of the complaint that merely "anticipate" a
defense based on federal law do not fall within the well-pleaded
complaint. 0 A declaratory judgment action, while fundamentally
defensive in nature, can still confer "arising under" jurisdiction. With a
complaint for a declaratory judgment, a court must construct a
hypothetical complaint, which the declaratory-judgment defendant
would have filed to resolve the claim in dispute.5
2. Step Two to Determining "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
The second step ("Step Two") looks at the substance of those claims
that can be seen through Step One's filter, determining whether they
truly "aris[e] under" federal law." Step Two is divided into two types of
federal claims--Category I claims and Category II claims. 3 Category I
claims are those where federal law creates the cause of action. Category
II claims are those where "it appears that some substantial, disputed
question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
state claims."55 Category II "arising under" jurisdiction is predicated on
the fact that "the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of ac-
tion does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction"-the
federal issue must be both "substantial" and "necessary. 56
D. "Arising Under" Jurisdiction as Applied to the Federal Circuit
The Supreme Court, in Christianson v. Colt Operating Industries,
Inc., linked the "arising under" language in § 1338, which defines both
the Federal Circuit's and district court's jurisdiction over patent cases to
the same language in § 133 1.57 The case considered whether antitrust
claims plead by the plaintiff fell within the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction." The Court held that "[1]inguistic consistency, to which [the
Supreme Court] historically adhered, demands that § 1338(a) jurisdic-
49. See e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
50. Id.
51. Skelly Oil Co. v. Philips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667,671-72 (1950) (noting that the
federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, does not create federal court jurisdiction
on its own.)
52. Oakley, supra note 41, at 1834.
53. Id. at 1834-43.
54. Id. at 1838-39. Category I claims meet Justice Holmes's test that "[a] suit arises un-
der the law that creates the cause of action." Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241
U.S. 257,260 (1916).
55. Oakley, supra n. 31, at 1839 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804, 813-17 (1986)); see also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13.
56. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813.
57. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-09.
58. Id.
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tion" be determined in the same manner as general federal question ju-
risdiction under § 133 .'9 The Supreme Court concluded that:
[Section] 1338(a) jurisdiction ... extend[s] only to those cases
in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that [I] fed-
eral patent law creates the cause of action or [II] that the
plaintiff's right to relief. necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.6°
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction can therefore be determined,
just like federal question jurisdiction, by applying two steps. First, the
well-pleaded complaint rule is applied, acting as a filter to define the
universe of claims before the district court that can confer "arising un-
der" patent jurisdiction (Step One). Second, those claims seen through
the well-pleaded complaint rule are analyzed to see if they fall within
either Category I or Category II and thus arise under patent law (Step
Two). The Supreme Court, in Christianson, was faced with a Step Two
question-whether an antitrust claim, contained in the plaintiff's com-
plaint, fell within either Category I or Category 11.61 While the Supreme
Court referenced Step One in Christianson, noting that the well-pleaded
complaint applied to Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction analysis, the
Court's decision did not turn on deciding a complex Step One question
because the claims in question were in the plaintiff's complaint. 62 The
Supreme Court handles Step One in detail in its decision in Holmes, dis-
cussed infra.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes, the Federal Cir-
cuit, other regional circuits, 63 and the Supreme Court in Christianson
spoke to the scope of appellate jurisdiction conferred by § 1295(a)(1).
The pre-Holmes case law on this issue can be divided into both Step One
and Step Two cases.
59. Id. at 808-09.
60. Id. (numerals added).
61. Id. at 810-14 (finding that Colt's Sherman Act claims did not necessarily depend on
the resolution of a substantial question of patent law and remanding the case to be transferred
the case to the Seventh Circuit).
62. Id. at 809.
63. Regional Circuits have jurisdiction to determine whether an appeal lies with it or the
Federal Circuit. See Smith v. Orr, 855 F.2d 1544, 1547-49 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Chabal v. Reagan,
822 F.2d 349, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1987); Shaw v. Gwatney, 795 F.2d 1351, 1353 (8th Cir. 1986);
but see C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 877-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
A case may be transferred from any circuit court to another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
When a case is transferred from one appellate court to another, the receiving court should be
deferential to the transferring court's decision and not transfer the appeal back unless the rul-
ing is "clearly erroneous" or "not plausible." Christianson, 486 U.S. at 819.
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1. Step One Cases Regarding the Federal
Circuit's Appellate Jurisdiction
Part of Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction jurisprudence has in-
volved answering questions presented by Step One-questions regarding
the manner or fashion a patent law claim must be presented to the district
court in order to be eligible to form the basis for the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction. 6' Claims in the complaint are clearly eligible, 65 as
are claims in declaratory judgment actions.66 Other Step One questions
have been more difficult to answer. Before Holmes, the Federal Circuit,
and other circuits, addressed whether the addition of other claims in a
case, in addition to patent law claims, removed that case from Federal
Circuit appellate jurisdiction. Courts have also addressed whether the
presentation of a patent law claim in a counterclaim or in one of a group
of cases that are consolidated affected the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
over the case. Courts have further examined whether patent law claims
added to or dismissed from a complaint prior to appeal change the Fed-
eral Circuit's jurisdiction over the case. The case law on these issues,
prior to Holmes, is explored below.
a. Issue versus Case Jurisdiction
67
Early on, the Federal Circuit rejected construing its appellate
jurisdiction to cover only patent issues, as opposed to the complete case.
This so-called "issue jurisdiction" would have limited the Federal
61Circuit's appellate jurisdiction to the individual patent issues in a case.
The Federal Circuit rejected "issue jurisdiction" early on in favor of
69appellate jurisdiction over all of the claims in a case. In Atari, the
64. Notably, the Step One questions, in the patent law context, arise almost exclusively
when deciding what appellate court a case should proceed to, not whether a district court has
jurisdiction over the case.
65. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809; Pixton v. B&B Plastics, Inc., 291 F.3d 1324, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
66. See Speedco, Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909. 911-12 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Skelly Oil,
339 U.S. at 672).
67. Technically, the question of whether the Federal Circuit should exercise issue or case
jurisdiction over an appealed cases does not present a traditional Step One question. But, de-
termining whether issue or case jurisdiction applies defines, like most Step One inquiries, the
universe of cases procedurally eligible to arise under federal law.
68. Such "issue jurisdiction" defined the appellate jurisdiction of the Temporary Emer-
gency Court of Appeals ("TECA") that had jurisdiction over Economic Stabilization Act
("ESA") issues that would be bifurcated from non-ESA issues, and then appealed to the ap-
propriate regional circuit. See Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604
F.2d 179, 183-87 (2d Cir. 1979).
69. See, e.g., Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (finding appellate jurisdiction over both a declaratory judgment action of invalidity and
unenforceability of a patent and antitrust claims); Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79
F.3d 1112, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding appellate jurisdiction over both a patent infringe-
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Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the argument that a single case,
that includes patent and non-patent claims, could be bifurcated on appeal
between the Federal Circuit and a regional circuit court as contrary to
§ 1295(a)(1) and the accompanying congressional intent.7 0 Even though
the district court separated the patent claims from the copyright claims
for trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), the Federal Circuit noted that
Congress "specifically rejected ... that [the Federal Circuit] should have
only 'issue' jurisdiction and that appeals involving patent and non-patent
issues should be bifurcated."7' Section 1295(a)(1) gives the Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over the "§ 1338 cases," not issues.7" The Court noted
that case jurisdiction, as opposed to issue jurisdiction, avoids "undue and
unnecessary burden of cost, confusion, and delay.. . on litigants, and on
",73the judicial process.
Using the same basic rationale for rejecting "issue jurisdiction," the
concept that Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction depends on the spe-
cific issues or claims on appeal was also rejected. Section 1295(a)(1)
bases the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction on the district court's
jurisdiction over the case, which must be based "in whole or in part" on
patent law.74 This jurisdiction is defined regardless of what claims are
actually on appeal. As the Supreme Court noted in Christianson, the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction, just like the district court's, is not
based on the "well-tried case," but the well-plead complaint.75 The Fed-
eral Circuit indicated in Atari that "the congressional reports reveal
Congress' clear intent to define [the Federal Circuit's] jurisdiction in re-
lation to that of the district court, and to assign to [the Federal Circuit]
appellate jurisdiction over all final, i.e., appealable, decisions of district
courts in cases ... where the district court's jurisdiction was and is based
in part on a continuing non-frivolous patent claim under § 1338, whether
ment claim and trade secret and breach of contract claims); Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klas-
sens, Inc., 53 F3d 1260, 1262-63 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding jurisdiction over a claim for
attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and trade dress and unfair competition claims); Bandag,
Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 908-09 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (denying the bifur-
cation of patent and trademark claims on appeal); Atari, 747 F.2d at 1440-41 (denying the
bifurcation of patent and copyright claims on appeal). See also Marsh v. Austin-Fort Worth
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 744 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 1984) (remanding the case back to
the district court because the court was unable to determine from the record whether a patent
claim was at issue before the district court in addition to Marsh's claims of unfair trade prac-
tices and fraud).
70. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1430-41.
71. Id. at 1435 (noting that Congress contrasted the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction with
that of TECA's) (citing H. Rep. No. 97-312 at 41).
72. Id. at 1435-36.
73. Id. at 1435.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
75. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 813-14.
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the appealed decision relates to an existing patent claim or to a non-
patent claim.' 76 The case law on this point gives the Federal Circuit ju-
risdiction over appeals from determinations on non-patent issues, as long
as the district court's jurisdiction was based, at least in part, on a patent
claim." Even when the appeal at issue is from a district court's grant of a
partial judgment, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), 8 on non-patent claims, the
Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction as long as patent law claims
existed below. 79 The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction over ancillary
76. Atari, 747 F2d at 1433 (citing H. Rep. No. 97-312 at 23-24).
77. See Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that
"Federal Circuit jurisdiction of this appeal derives from the counts for declaration of inventor-
ship and unenforceability under the patent laws" even though only state law issues were the
subject of the appeal); Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(finding appellate jurisdiction over a judgment on state law counterclaims, including tortuous
interference and abuse of process, while Abbott did not appeal the district court's decision on
its inventorship claims); Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF Inc., 828 F.2d 755, 756-57 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (taking appellate jurisdiction over AMF's counterclaims seeking declaratory judgment
canceling Windsurfing International's registered trademarks, while Windsurfing International's
patent infringement claims had been stayed pending the outcome of a reissue proceeding);
Atari, 747 F.2d at 1440-41 (exercising jurisdiction over an appeal from the grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction based on copyright infringement, while the patent claims had yet to be
resolved); Albert v. Kevex Corp., 729 F.2d 757, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (hearing an appeal from a
summary judgment regarding Albert's claims of interference with a prospective business ad-
vantage and antitrust violations, with the patent infringement claim having yet to be
adjudicated).
See also Breed v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 253 F.3d 1173, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 2001) (transfer-
ring an appeal regarding multiple state law claims relating to breach of contract and trade
secret misappropriation because, while at oral argument Breed indicated he would not con-
tinue to assert his inventorship claims, Breed's well-plead complaint still contained these
patent law claims and therefore vested the Federal Circuit with appellate jurisdiction); Ken-
nedy v. Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 964-69 (7th Cir. 1988) (transferring an appeal because, while
the appeal involved no issues of patent law due to the basis for the district court's decision on
appeal, the complaint below still contained a patent law claim).
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) reads:
Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are in-
volved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of deci-
sion, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
79. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 697, 701-02 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (finding appellate jurisdiction over a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certified judgment on antitrust
counterclaims where patent infringement claims still served as part of the district court's juris-
diction over the case); Korody-Colyer Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1573-74
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding appellate jurisdiction over a partial summary judgment regarding
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discovery proceedings,o8 petitions for writ of mandamus,8 and interlocu-
tory appeals82 that involve non-patent issues in cases where patent claims
are present.
b. Counterclaims
While patent-related defenses have never conferred Federal Circuit
appellate jurisdiction,3 patent law counterclaims, both compulsory and
permissive, could serve as the basis for the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction. The First Circuit was the first appellate court to hold 1 that a
antitrust claims entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. R 54(b) when the court had previously heard
an appeal from the patent claims before the district); see also Technicon Instruments Corp. v.
Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417, 418-20 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (exercising appellate jurisdiction over
antitrust counterclaims that were separated from patent infringement claims). But see Denbi-
care U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F3d 1143, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying Federal
Circuit appellate jurisdiction over a finding of copyright infringement that was separated from
patent claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that were dismissed with prejudice); Unique
Concepts Inc. v. Manuel, 930 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that if non-patent claims
were separated by the district court using Fed. R. Civ. R 54(b), then there would be "a better
argument" for regional circuit appellate jurisdiction), affirmed on transfer, 937 F.2d 622, 1991
WL 93202 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (unpublished table opinion); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies,
Inc., 770 F2d 1035, 1036-37 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (transferring the case to the Seventh Circuit
where the patent claims were heard by the Seventh Circuit before the Federal Circuit's crea-
tion and the patent claims were separated from the antitrust claims under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b)).
The Federal Circuit distinguished USM Corp. based on the fact that a transfer in USM
Corp. advanced judicial economy, with the Seventh Circuit already having heard the patent
claims, and the separation of claims occurred before the Federal Circuit had come into exis-
tence. See Korody-Colver, 828 F.2d at 1574.
80. See McCook Metals LLC v. Alcoa, Inc., 249 F.3d 330, 330-34 (4th Cir. 2001) (trans-
ferring an appeal from an order to enforce a subpoena to the Federal Circuit because the
underlying action was based in part on § 1338); Dorf & Stanton Communications, Inc. v.
Molson Breweries, 56 F.3d 13, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1995) (transferring an appeal from a discovery
ruling ancillary to a patent case and trademark case to the Federal Circuit).
81. See Lights of Am., Inc. v. U. S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Ca., 130 E3d 1369,
1370-71 (9th Cir. 1997) (transferring a petition for mandamus to the Federal Circuit because
the district court's jurisdiction was based, at least in part, on patent law claims); In re BBC
Int'l, Ltd., 99 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 1996) (transferring a petition for mandamus to the Fed-
eral Circuit because the district court's "jurisdiction rests on a patent claim" and therefore "an
appeal from an entirely non-patent disposition goes to the Federal Circuit").
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c).
83. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809 ("[A] case raising a federal patent-law defense
does not, for that reason alone, 'arise under' patent law, 'even if the defense is anticipated in
the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question
truly at issue in the case.'" (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14)); Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. Co., 211 U.S. at 152; Speedco, 853 F.2d at 912-13; Schwarzkopf Development
Corp. v. TI-Coating, Inc., 800 F.2d 240, 244 (Fed. Cir. 1986); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716
F.2d 874 at 879 (Ca. Fed. 1983).
84. Before the First Circuit spoke on the issue, the Federal Circuit addressed the possibil-
ity of a counterclaim providing arising under jurisdiction in dicta in two cases, Schwarzkopf
and In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In Schwarzkopf, the Federal
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patent law counterclaim, on its own, could vest the Federal Circuit with
appellate jurisdiction.85 The Federal Circuit followed up with its decision
in Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd.,86
which held that, while the well-pleaded complaint rule governed "arising
under" jurisdiction under § 1338, the legislative history behind the crea-
tion of the Federal Circuit and its jurisdictional statutes required the
Federal Circuit to have jurisdiction over patent law counterclaims.87 The
court's holding in Aerojet was later expanded to cover permissive coun-
terclaims.88  The Federal Circuit found "no sufficient basis in the
language or purpose of section 1295(a)(1) to distinguish between com-
pulsory and permissive counterclaims. 89 The Federal Circuit has
continued to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal where the only patent
law claims before the district court are counterclaims.' For example, the
court heard an appeal of a complaint alleging antitrust violations due to
the refusal to sell patented repair parts and copyrighted instruction
manuals, where the only patent claim resided in a counterclaim.9
Circuit held that the patent law counterclaims were dismissed voluntarily, and therefore could
not confer jurisdiction. See Schwarzkopf, 800 F2d at 244-45. But the court did note that "[t]he
patent counts of Ti-Coating's counterclaim, for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, non-
infringement, and unenforceability, are within the jurisdiction of the district court under
§ 1338 ... [and] [t]hus appellate jurisdiction over suits involving a § 1338 counterclaim is
assigned to the Federal Circuit." Id. at 244.
The Federal Circuit made a similar statement in Innotron, commenting that "whether alle-
gations of patent infringement be filed and maintained as a viable, non-frivolous counterclaim
in a non-patent case, or as a separate complaint which is then consolidated with the non-patent
case, the district court's jurisdiction is based 'in part' on § 1338(a) and this court must exercise
its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the entire case." 800 F.2d at 1080 (finding appellate
jurisdiction over a consolidated case including an antitrust complaint and patent infringement
complaint).
85. Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 825 F.2d 604, 604-07 (1st Cir. 1987) (transferring the appeal
of the denial of a preliminary injunction on an antitrust claim to the Federal Circuit because
Atex alleged patent infringement counterclaims below). The First Circuit concluded that "pat-
ent counts of a counterclaim fall within the district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338," and therefore the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit under § 1295(a)(1). Id.
at 607.
86. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F2d 736,
745 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
87. Id. at 740-45 (exercising jurisdiction over Aerojet's unfair competition claims). The
Federal Circuit came to this conclusion while considering the Supreme Court's decision in
Christianson that the well-pleaded complaint rule applied to § 1338(a). Id.
88. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
89. Id. at 1359 (exercising jurisdiction over the judgment on DSC's copyright and trade
secret claims and Pulse Communications unrelated patent infringement counterclaims).
90. The court's appellate jurisdiction in Holmes over the district court's decision regard-
ing a trade dress claim was based on a patent law counterclaim. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at
1892-93.
91. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See also
Leatherman Tool Group Inc. v. Cooper Indus., 131 F.3d 1011, 1013-15 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (con-
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c. Amendments and Dismissals
The Federal Circuit has also taken jurisdiction over appeals where
patent claims were added to the initial complaint by amendment. Under
the well-pleaded complaint rule, the "amended complaint. .. is control-
ling for the purpose of determining jurisdiction" on appeal.92 The Federal
Circuit has even exercised jurisdiction over an appeal from a case in
which the patent claim was added to the complaint after remand from a
decision by another regional circuit.93 The Federal Circuit looks at the
complaint, at the time of appeal and determines whether the claims as-
serted arise under patent law, regardless of whether these claims were
present in the initial filings.94
Whether a patent law claim dismissed prior to appeal can confer ju-
risdiction appears to depend on the nature and circumstances
surrounding the patent claim's dismissal or removal from the case. The
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over those cases relies on whether
the patent law claim is dismissed with or without prejudice. 95 Whether
the patent claim was dismissed voluntarily or not has also been seen as
part of the decision calculus for determining Federal Circuit appellate
sidering whether a counterclaim to a complaint alleging trade dress infringement included a
substantial and necessary issue of patent law so as to give the Federal Circuit appellate juris-
diction).
92. Kunkel v. Topmaster Int'l, Inc., 906 F.2d 693, 695-97 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (exercising
appellate jurisdiction over a case in which a patent infringement claim was amended to the
original complaint); A.H.J. Vink v. Hendrikus Johannes Schijf, Rolkan N.V., 839 F.2d 676,
677-78 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
93. Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 790 E2d 874, 876 & n.2. The original com-
plaint in Eaton alleged three state law counts of trade secret misappropriation, which the
district court had jurisdiction over because of diversity. Id. at 875. Eaton moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction on these claims that was denied, and Eaton appealed this denial to the Seventh
Circuit. Id. at 875-76. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial and remanded the case to the
district court, which granted Eaton leave to file an amended complaint that contained, among
other things, a claim of patent infringement. Id. at 876.
94. See, e.g., MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1569-71 (finding
appellate jurisdiction over claims for determination and correction of inventorship under 35
U.S.C. § 256 that were added to a complaint initially only alleging violations of the Lanham
Act).
None of the Federal Circuit cases discussing its appellate jurisdiction over an amended
complaint address amendments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b), which allows a complaint to be
amended to include a new and independent cause of action that has been "tried by express or
implied consent of the parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) operates to treat
such issues tried as if they were "raised in the pleadings.' Id. The Supreme Court, in
Christianson, while mentioning Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b), did not address whether "a court of
appeals could furnish itself a jurisdictional basis unsupported by the pleadings by deeming the
complaint amended" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) because there was no evidence in that case of
any consent by the parties to the litigation of a new patent law claim. Christianson, 486 U.S.
at 814-15.
95. See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit Under § 1295(a)(1), 11 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 651, 661 (2001-2002).
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jurisdiction. 96 If a dismissal is without prejudice and/or voluntary, the
Federal Circuit has no jurisdiction over the appeal.
The Federal Circuit has maintained its appellate jurisdiction over
cases in which the patent law claims have been dismissed with prejudice
prior to appeal by entry of a joint stipulation and proposed order.97
Whereas, the Federal Circuit has transferred to regional circuits, those
cases in which the only patent claims before the district court were dis-
missed without any opposition by the pleading party.98 The Federal
Circuit also did not exercise jurisdiction over a case where the only pat-
ent claims were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff without prejudice
prior to appeal. 99 The court denied appellate jurisdiction over an appeal
in which the only patent law claim was dismissed without prejudice un-
der Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (b). 1°
96. See Douglas Y'Barbo, On the Patent Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: A Few Sim-
ple Rules, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 651, 660-61 (Sept. 1997).
97. Zenith Electrics. Corp. v. Exzecs, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The
substance of the appeal in Zenith focused on the district court's dismissal, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), of Exzecs counterclaims of unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act and corresponding state law. Id. at 1342-43. The district court had dismissed Zenith's
patent claims with prejudice upon a joint order presented by the parties. Id. at 1346. The Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that this dismissal with prejudice "constitute[d] an adjudication of the
claims on the merits, not an amendment of the complaint," and therefore the district court still
had jurisdiction over the patent claims, and, as a result, the Federal Circuit had appellate juris-
diction. Id. (citing Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
98. Schwarzkopf, 800 F.2d at 243-45. The patent claims in Schwarzkopf that were dis-
missed without opposition were counterclaims plead by Ti-Coating. Id. at 241. The court
reasoned that:
Ti-Coating's entire counterclaim was dismissed during the pleading stage. Since no
objection was interposed by Ti-Coating, that dismissal was final and not appealable.
Whatever the merits of the dismissal, the transient appearance of the counterclaim
did not give it irrevocable control of the jurisdictional basis of the case.
Id. at 245.
99. Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 516-19 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Gronholz
moved, without opposition, to have both his patent infringement claim and trade secret misap-
propriation claim dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 516. The district court granted
Gronholz's unopposed motion with respect to the patent law claim, but not the trade secret
claim. Id. The court then entered judgment with respect to the trade secret claim, and
Gronholz appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id. The Federal Circuit addressed its appellate
jurisdiction over Gronholz appeal, first noting that that Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) governed the
motion for voluntary dismissal of the patent infringement claim. Id. at 517. However, the court
observed that a voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) is more properly viewed in the
case as an amendment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, and therefore, Gronholz motion "constituted
an amendment of his complaint" leaving only non-patent claims in the complaint before the
district court. Id. at 517-18. The court also noted that Gronholz's actions did not appear to be
an effort to manipulate appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 518 n.2.
100. Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 783-85 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The district court
in Nilssen dismissed Nilssen's patent infringement claims before trial upon Motorola's motion
to bifurcate the patent claims from the state law trade secret claims, giving Nilssen leave to
file a new complaint alleging patent infringement. Id. at 783. While Nilssen did not formally
oppose Motorola's bifurcation motion, "Nilssen protested the separation of the claims during a
"Arising Under"
Regional circuits have also addressed the issue of pre-appeal dis-
missal, looking at similar factors such as whether the claim was
dismissed with prejudice or whether the dismissal was voluntary. For
example, the Seventh Circuit transferred an appeal to the Federal Circuit
when the district court granted a patentee's motion to dismiss its patent
infringement claims "conditioned on the execution of a covenant to not
re-file the patent suit against" the defendant.'0 ' On the other hand, the
Fifth Circuit assumed jurisdiction over a case in which the patent claims
were dismissed by the district court without prejudice.' °2
d. Consolidation
The Federal Circuit also exercised its appellate jurisdiction over ap-
peals in cases where patent law claims were consolidated with other
district court cases. This issue was first addressed by the Federal Circuit
in Interpart Corp. v. Italia, where the Federal Circuit took jurisdiction
over both the appeal from a patent case and an unfair competition case
status hearing." Id. The Federal Circuit held that "[t]he voluntariness or involuntariness of a
dismissal is not controlling in this context because, regardless whether the patent claims were
dismissed without prejudice or extinguished by amendment, the effect is the same. The parties
were left in the same legal position with respect to the patent claims as if they had never been
filed." Id. at 784-85.
Judge Rader dissented in Nilssen, arguing that based on prior controlling Federal Circuit
case, namely Atari, 747 F.2d at 1431, the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction because "the district
court dismissed over Nilssen's objection under Fed. Re. Civ. P 41(b)," making it an involun-
tary dismissal. Nilssen, 203 F.2d at 785 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit, hearing the transferred case, ordered the district court to
reconsolidate the patent and trade secret claims because the claims rested on a common nu-
cleus of facts and bifurcation would squander judicial resources and risk potentially
inconsistent appellate decisions between the Seventh Circuit, with jurisdiction over the trade
secret case, and Federal Circuit, with jurisdiction over the patent infringement case. Nilssen v.
Motorola, Inc., 255 F.3d 410, 412-15 (7th Cir. 2001). The court noted that once consolidated,
the case would again be appealed to one circuit, the Federal Circuit. Id. at 414-15.
101. See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Manuel, 930 F.2d 573, 574-75 (7"' Cir. 1991). Unique
Concepts's motion asked the district to dismiss the patent claims without prejudice. Id. at 574.
The patent claims were pending with counterclaims by Manuel under state deception and
consumer protection law. Id. at 573-74. The Federal Circuit ruled on the merits of the trans-
ferred case, affirming the district court's decision below. See Unique Concepts v. Manuel, 937
F2d 622, 1991 WL 93202 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 1991) (unpublished table decision).
102. Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams, 263 F.3d 447, 453-55 (5th Cir.
2001). The court noted that Logan moved to dismiss the patent infringement claims with
prejudice, but the district court failed to specify whether the dismissal was with or without
prejudice. Id. at 453. The district court amended its order to indicate the dismissal was with
prejudice, but this amendment occurred after the filing of Logan's notice of appeal, and there-
fore the district court was without jurisdiction to make such a substantive change. Id. at 454.
The Fifth Circuit based its decision to exercise jurisdiction on the Federal Circuit's holding in
Nilssen, noting that the only question relevant to the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction is
whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. Id. at 454-55.
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that were consolidated.o3 The Federal Circuit commented that it did not
have jurisdiction over Interpart's declaratory judgment suit regarding
unfair competition, but that once Italia's patent suit was combined with
Interpart's suit, "the case became one that would fall within [the Federal
Circuit's] jurisdiction when appealed.""' The Federal Circuit came to a
similar holding in another case, exercising jurisdiction over a petition for
writ of mandamus requesting that the district court re-consolidate a pat-
ent and an antitrust case for trial. 5 The Federal Circuit concluded that
"[a]t the time the district court issued the separation order ... jurisdic-
tion of the entire consolidated case was based 'in part' on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338" due to one of the complaints below alleging patent infringe-
ment, and "[h]ence [the Federal Circuit] has exclusive jurisdiction of an
appeal from the final judgment in this case.""" The court further noted
that the appeal was from "one lawsuit" and that the consolidation "pro-
duced the same status as that which would have obtained if [one party]
had filed its patent claim as a counterclaims."'0 7 The Federal Circuit rea-
soned that it would be inconsistent to not find jurisdiction over a
consolidated case but entertain jurisdiction over a counterclaim.0 Since
this holding, the Federal Circuit has exercised appellate jurisdiction over
a petition for an extraordinary writ from an order consolidating five
pending lawsuits, one of which included no patent law claims.'"
Other regional circuits have followed the Federal Circuit's holdings
in this area, transferring appeals from cases in which patent claims were
consolidated with a breach of contract suit''0 or a trademark suit"' to the
Federal Circuit. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Federal Circuit stating
that "[s]o long as the [patent and non-patent] actions were consolidated,
section 1295 unquestionably vested the Federal Circuit with exclusive
jurisdiction of the entire action; however, when the consolidation order
103. Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 680-81 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (consolidated pursu-
ant to Fed. R. Civ. P 42(a)).
104. Id.
105. Innotron, 800 F2d at 1080-81 (consolidated under Fed. R. Civ. P 42(a) and then
separated for trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b)).
106. Id. at 1080.
107. Id.
108. Id. "Thus the mere labeling and sequencing of pleadings in the trial tribunal cannot
be allowed to control every exercise of [the Federal Circuit's] appellate jurisdiction." Id.
109. In re Regents of Univ. of Ca., 964 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
110. Wang Labs, Inc. v. Applied Computer Sciences, Inc., 926 F2d 92, 93-94 (1st Cir.
1991) ("The breach of contract suit" that was consolidated with the contempt action "was
grounded in Massachusetts state law; had it not been consolidated with the contempt case, the
contract appeal could be heard by [the First Circuit].")
11. Dorf& Stanton Communications, Inc. v. Molson Breweries, 56 F.3d 13, 15-16 (2d
Cir. 1995) (finding Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over a consolidated discovery ruling
regarding a patent case and a separate trademark case).
"Arising Under"
was vacated, the antitrust action returned to its original independent
statue. Therefore, appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the antitrust
complaint dismissal "is proper in [the Fifth Circuit] under 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1291.' 12 However, the Seventh Circuit transferred an appeal from an
antitrust case, that was consolidated with a patent case for pretrial pur-
poses only, to the First Circuit instead of the Federal Circuit."' The court
concluded that if the antitrust case was tried separately, the appeal would
lie with the regional circuit, not the Federal Circuit."
4
2. Step Two Cases Regarding the Federal Circuit's
Appellate Jurisdiction
The other area of jurisprudence regarding the Federal Circuit's ap-
pellate jurisdiction focuses on Step Two of the "arising under"
analysis-whether the substance of those claims that fall within the well-
pleaded complaint filter arise under patent law. The way in which Step
Two questions are handled in the patent law context was addressed by
the Supreme Court in Christianson. The Federal Circuit cases, as well as
regional circuit cases, on the subject of appellate jurisdiction over patent
issues fall into one of the two categories listed in Christianson. It is im-
portant to note that even if a claim falls into one of these two categories,
frivolous claims cannot serve as the basis for Federal Circuit appellate
jurisdiction."'
a. Category I-Patent Law Creates the Cause of Action
The easier cases to decide under the substantive prong of the "arising
under" jurisdictional test involve those cases where federal patent law
creates the cause of action." 6 The Federal Circuit has held, for example,
that federal patent law creates the cause of action for (1) claims of patent
112. Tank Insulation Int'l, Inc. v. Insultherm, Inc., 104 F.3d 83, 85 (5th Cir. 1997) (find-
ing appellate jurisdiction over the antitrust case because it was unconsolidated from the patent
case).
113. FMC Corp. v. Glouster Eng'g Co., 830 F.2d 770, 772-73 (7th Cir. 1987).
114. See id. The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that for some circuits, consolidation for
pretrial purposes can also be considered consolidated for appeals purposes. Id. at 773.
115. See, e.g., Eaton, 790 F.2d at 876 n.3 (Claims that are "baseless or frivolous or"
whose " addition to the complaint was a tactical procedural maneuver" cannot form the basis
for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction.).
116. The Supreme Court noted that the Holmes's test, which Category I is based on, is
"more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district court's
original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond the district court jurisdic-
tion." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9.
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infringement;" 7 (2) claims regarding inventorship under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 116, 256;"s (3) claims for attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285; 1'9 and
(4) claims regarding the suspension of a patent attorney's license to prac-
tice pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 32. 20 The Federal Circuit has also found that
statutes outside of Title 35 are part of federal patent law and confer
§ 1338 jurisdiction. For example, a claim for compensation regarding the
Tennessee Valley Authority's right to practice patents pursuant to 16
U.S.C. § 831r are created by federal patent law,12t as well as a claim that
117. See, e.g. Kidde, Inc. v. E.F. Bavis & Associates, Inc., 735 F.2d 1085, 1085-86 (8th
Cir. 1984) (transferring an appeal of a declaratory judgment action of non-infringement and
invalidity to the Federal Circuit).
Based on how a plaintiff pleads their claims, a claim of patent infringement can still con-
fers jurisdiction on the district court and Federal Circuit even when conditioned upon the
resolution of a licensing contract dispute. See Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479,
480 (1915); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1912); Littlefield v.
Perry, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 205, 223 (1874) (finding claim brought by licensee arose under pat-
ent laws); Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282, 291 (1902) (same);
Kunkel v. Topmaster Int'l, 906 F.2d 693, 695-97(Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding jurisdiction under
§ 1338 even though answering a question of contract law may moot the claims of patent in-
fringement); Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 273 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(finding § 1338 jurisdiction even though the dispute was between contracting parties); Air
Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Reichhold Chemicals., Inc., 755 F.2d 1559, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (finding jurisdiction under § 1338 because the plaintiff averred that the defendant in-
fringes, and continues to infringe, one of the plaintiff's patents); see also Hale, supra note 14,
at 245-46..
Also, the Federal Circuit, and district courts, retain jurisdiction over disputes regarding
settlements and consent judgments resulting from patent infringement cases, particularly when
these agreements are integrated into the district court's final judgment. See Novamedix, Ltd. v.
NDM Acquisition Corp., 166 F.3d 1177, 1179-80 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Gjerlov v. Schuyler Labo-
ratories, Inc., 131 F.3d 1016, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Interspiro USA, Inc. v. Figgie Int'l Inc.,
18 F.3d 927, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying regional circuit law); Joy Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Mine
Serv. Co., 810 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (looking to the regional circuit law for
guidance); but see Clausen Co. v. Dynatron/Bonso Corp., 889 F.2d 459, 464-65 (3d Cir.
1989).
118. See Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (exercising appel-
late jurisdiction over a claim for correction of multiple patents due to failure to name the
proper inventors); Bradley, 136 F.3d at 1320 (noting that "Federal Circuit jurisdiction of this
appeal derives from the counts for declaration of inventorship and unenforceability under the
patent laws"); Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473-74 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (exer-
cising appellate jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action of proper inventorship); MCV,
870 F.2d at 1569-71 (finding appellate jurisdiction over a claim for correction of improper
inventorship); see also Re, supra note 95, at 658.
119. See Imagineering, 53 F.3d at 1263; see also Re, supra note 95, at 658-59.
120. See Wyden v. Comm'r of Patents & Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934, 935-37 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (en banc) ("deciding that § 32 is an Act of Congress which related to patents within the
meaning of § 1338(a) and that Wynden's action is a civil action" [challenging his suspension
from practice before the USPTO] "arising under § 32"); Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 802 F.2d
532, 533-37 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (transferring an appeal to the Federal Circuit because the case
included a claim challenging the USPTO's suspension of Jaskiewicz's license pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 32).
121. See Alco Standard Corp. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1493-95 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (noting that "[i]t would be anomalous if appeals in patent infringement suits against
"Arising Under"
the Department of Energy does not own a patent pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 5908(a). 22 In contrast to these cases, the Federal Circuit held that 35
U.S.C. § 294, which gives district courts the ability to enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate patent disputes, cannot form the basis for a cause of
action or district court jurisdiction because no claims arise under that
statute.
23
b. Category II-Substantial and Necessary Question of Patent Law
The tougher question for courts to answer under Step Two is whether
a claim meets the Category II test enumerated in Christianson "that the
plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substan-
tial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary
element of one of the well-pleaded claims."'2" As exemplified by the Su-
preme Court's application of this test in Christianson, a claim that is
"supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the ba-
sis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of
those theories"' 2 The Federal Circuit has found a substantial and neces-
sary question of patent law, for example, in the following cases: (1) a
claim seeking an earlier patent filing date from the USPTO;'26 (2) a claim
asserting that the USPTO should revive a patent application or at least
allow the filing of a continuation; 27 (3) a claim seeking to invalidate a
rule issued by the Commissioner of the USPTO;'2s (4) a state law claim
TVA were heard by the regional circuit, when all other appeals in patent infringement suits
come to this court").
122. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1577-80 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding
that 42 U.S.C. § 5908(a) "clearly 'relat[es] to' patents").
123. Ballard Med. Prods. v. Wright, 823 F.2d 527, 531 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
124. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808-09. "The Supreme Court has been more successful
in defending the existence of this category then in defining its scope." Oakley, supra note 41,
at 1839.
125. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810 (noting that, while a patent-law issue was "arguably
necessary to at least one theory under each [Sherman Act] claim," resolution of a patent-law
issue "is not necessary to the overall success of either claim").
126. See Dubost v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1565-1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (noting that Dubost's claim required a construction of 35 U.S.C. § 111 to determine
if an unsigned check meets the fee requirements for filing an application).
127. Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding appellate juris-
diction because Morganroth's claim asserted that her right to revival, or at least the right to file
a continuation, was supported by the proper interpretation of 35 U.S.C. §§ 41(a)(7), 133 and
35 U.S.C. § 120 respectively).
128. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 900 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1990) (transfer-
ring the appeal to the Federal Circuit because the claims below required the resolution of
whether the Commissioner exceeded his statutory authority under the Patent Act by promul-
gating the rule in dispute).
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requiring the proof of the falsity of patent infringement accusations ' or
statements of patent validity;30 (5) a claim for breach of contract that
requires a determination of patent infringement;' 31 (6) a claim challeng-
ing a bankruptcy court decision including allegations of patent
infringement;'32 (7) a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") to review the denial of a petition to the USPTO to accept a pat-
ent application;'33  and (8) non-patent claims that require the
determination of whether a particular patent application is the continua-
tion-in-part of another application.' 34 In contrast, the Federal Circuit has
not found a substantial and necessary question of patent law, for exam-
ple, in the following cases: (1) a contract claim regarding ownership of a
patent; 13 (2) a contract claim that, as plead, simply involves patents, but
does not require answering questions of infringement, invalidity, or un-
enforceability;'3 6 (3) a counterclaim "based on a federal right to copy
129. 3d Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1377 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Ad-
ditive Controls & Measurements Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 477-79 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
130. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1324-31 (Fed. Cir.
1998), overruled in part, Midwest Trailer, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
131. U.S. Valves Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 813-15 (7th Cir. 1999) (transferring the ap-
peal to the Federal Circuit because the only way to determine the breach of the exclusivity
provision of the license agreement depended on whether certain valves sold infringed the
licensed patents); Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (transfer-
ring the appeal to the Federal Circuit because "determining whether [one defendant] infringed
the [plaintiff's] patents is a necessary element to recovery of additional royalties or a finding
that [another defendant] breached the Patent License Agreement" by acquiring a new company
that allegedly infringed the patents).
132. In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
133. Helfgott & Karas v. Dickenson, 209 F.3d 1328, 1333-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting
that the APA claims involved the Commissioner's duties identified in 35 U.S.C. § 364).
134. Univ. of W. Va. v. Vanhoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
135. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1323-25 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (remanding a contract case back to the district court with instructions to remand to state
court); Speedco, 853 F.2d at 911-15 (finding no jurisdiction because the only patent law issues
would be an element of a defense to the contract suit, and therefore did not satisfy the well-
plead complaint rule); Consol. World Housewares, Inc. v. Finkle, 831 F.2d 261, 264-65 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (finding no appellate jurisdiction over a contract case that "may involve a determi-
nation of the true inventor"); Beghin-Say Int'l, Inc. v. Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568, 1570-72(Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding no appellate jurisdiction over a case involving a question of contract
interpretation as to whether title was "conveyed... to two then non-existent U.S. patent appli-
cations").
136. Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1576-79 (finding that the
wording of the patent claim, as plead in a contract suit, to rob the district court of jurisdiction);
In re Oximetrix, Inc., 748 F.2d 637, 641-43 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (denying appellate jurisdiction
over a petition for mandamus from a district court's remand of a case back to state court)("The action arose under state contract laws, not under the patent laws"-"[t]he complaint
spoke only of contract claims-[i]t said not a word about patent infringement").
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what is in the public domain" that mentions patent law;'37 (4) a trade se-
cret misappropriation claim that involves material contained in a patent
application;'38 and (5) a declaratory judgment claim from state bar disci-
plinary proceeding asserting that federal patent law preempted the
proceedings.'
39
The above is a quick review of the state of the law governing the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. With this setting, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Holmes will be examined.
II. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN HOLMES
A. Procedural History
On November 26, 1999, Vornado lodged a complaint with the United
States International Trade Commission ("ITC") claiming that Holmes's
fan and heater products infringed Vornado's protectable trade dress under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act.'40 The next month, Holmes sued Vornado in
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, with its com-
plaint setting forth seven causes of action: "(1) declaratory judgment of
non-liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) [§ 43 of the Lanham Act];
(2) violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, §§ 2 and 11; (3) violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a); (4) [] interference with prospective economic advan-
tage; (5) defamation; (6) unfair competition; and (7) injurious
falsehood."' 4' Vornado answered Holmes's complaint, specifically alleg-
ing counterclaims of trade dress infringement and patent infringement.
42
The parties agreed that the trade dress at issue "is the exact same me-
chanical configuration which the Tenth Circuit has explicitly held
'cannot be protected by trade dress.' ,'4
Holmes requested a preliminary injunction which the district court
granted, finding that Vornado could not claim that the fan grill at issue
137. Leatherman Tool Group, 131 F.3d at 1013-15 (transferring the appeal because fed-
eral patent laws do not create any affirmative right to make, use, or sell anything).
138. Uroplasty, Inc. v. Advanced Uroscience, Inc., 239 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (noting that "the mere presence of the patent does not create a substantial issue of patent
law").
139. Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that Kroll's
claim, while requiring some understanding of the duties before the USPTO, does not raise a
substantial question of patent law).
140. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1140,
1141 (D. Kan. 2000); Petitioner's Brief to the Supreme Court in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vor-
nado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. No. 01-408, 2002 WL 24105, *3 n.2 (Jan. 4, 2002).
141. See Petitioner's Brief, 2002 WL 24105 at *3.
142. See Holmes, 93 E Supp.2d at 1141; Petitioner's Brief, 2002 WL 24105 at *4-5 n.3.
143. See Holmes, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
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was protectable trade dress in light of the Tenth Circuit's earlier deci-
sion. 4 Vornado appealed this holding to the Federal Circuit, but after the
appeal was filed, the district court granted Holmes' motion for summary
judgment on the same issue. 145 Vornado dismissed its earlier appeal, and
filed an appeal from the grant of summary judgment to the Federal Cir-
cuit. Vornado withdrew its ITC complaint, and the ITC investigation was
terminated on July 20, 2000.'46 In addition, Vornado entered into a joint
stipulation that its patent infringement counterclaims would be stayed
pending the result of the Federal Circuit appeal, and that if it lost its ap-
peal, the patent infringement counterclaims would be dismissed with
prejudice. 47
On appeal, in addition to arguing the merits, Holmes contended that
the proper venue for appeal was the Tenth Circuit, not the Federal Cir-
cuit because its complaint did not allege any claims "arising under"
patent law and Vornado's patent infringement counterclaim cannot create
"arising under" jurisdiction because that would violate the well-pleaded
complaint rule.' 8 After the appeal was heard by the Federal Circuit, the
Supreme Court's decision in Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc.'49 was handed down. The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to reevaluate its decision in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Traffix.5"
B. Supreme Court's Decision
Holmes challenged the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction in its
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Court granted Holmes's
petition "to consider whether the Federal Circuit properly asserted juris-
diction over [Vomado's] appeal."' 5'
1. Majority's Opinion
The Supreme Court began its decision by focusing on the specific
statute that vests the Federal Circuit with its exclusive appellate jurisdic-
144. See Petitioner's Brief, 2002 WIL 24105 at *3.
145. Holmes, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-45.
146. See id.; 65 Fed. Reg. 45999 (July 26, 2000).
147. See Petitioner's Brief, 2002 WL 24105 at *10 n.8.
148. See id. at*11.
149. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
150. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., No. 00-1286, 13 Fed.
Appx. 961, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2001).
151. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1892. The Court indicated in a footnote that, just as in
Christianson, "this case does not call upon us to decide whether the Federal Circuit's jurisdic-
tion is fixed with reference to the complaint as initially filed or whether an actual or
constructive amendment to the complaint raising a patent-law claim can provide the founda-
tion for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction." Id. at 1893 n. 1.
"Arising Under"
tion over patent cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).'5 2 The Court noted that
§ 1295(a)(1) provided the Federal Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction over
cases in which the district court's jurisdiction "was based on, in whole or
in part, [28 U.S.C. §] 1338."'"' The Court then turned to the language of
§ 1338, which it noted provided for district courts to have jurisdiction
over "civil action[s] arising under any Act of Congress relating to pat-
ents . . . ."' After looking at the text of the statute, the Court concluded
that "the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of
the district court, and turns on whether the action arises under federal
patent law."'55
The Court then indicated that the language, "arising under," in
§ 1338(a) is the same "operative language as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the stat-
ute conferring general federal-question jurisdiction."'' 1 6 Turning to its
decision in Christianson, the Court stated that "[1linguistic consistency"
required it to apply the same "arising under" test employed under
§ 1338(a) as is applied under § 133 1.17. Considering that the well-
pleaded-complaint rule case law "has long governed whether a case
'arises under' federal law for purposes of § 1331," the Court applied the
rule to determine the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.5 S
Quoting Christianson, the Court concluded that "appropriately adopted
to § 1338(a)," the well-pleaded complaint rule provides that whether a
case "arises under" patent law "must be determined from what necessar-
ily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or
declaration . . . ."9 Holmes, the plaintiff below, did not assert any claim
arising under federal patent law in its complaint, and therefore, based on
the well-pleaded complaint rule, the civil action did not "aris[e] under"
federal patent law and the Federal Circuit did not have appellate jurisdic-
tion.' 6° The requirements of § 1338(a) were not met, and thus, in turn,
§ 1295(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction on the Federal Circuit.
The Court turned to Vornado's argument that the well-pleaded-
complaint rule allows "counterclaim[s] to serve as the basis for a district
court's 'arising under' jurisdiction."'' 6 While having never directly
152. See id. at 1892-93.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1893 (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Court also indicated, in a footnote, that the well-pleaded complaint rule
governs the removability of a case from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Id. at
1893 n.2 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1 (1983)).
159. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893.
160. See id.
161. Id.
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addressed whether counterclaims can establish "arising under"
jurisdiction, the Court first focused on the fact that its case law,
regarding the well pleaded complaint rule, looked at the "plaintiff's
properly pleaded complaint."' 62 Citing previous case law holding that
answers cannot be consulted to determine whether a case arises under
federal law, the Court declined to adopt Vornado's proposed well-
pleaded complaint rule that allowed a counterclaim, "which appears as
part of the defendant's answer, not as part of the plaintiff's complaint," to
"serve as the basis for 'arising under' jurisdiction.' 63
In addition to its case law regarding answers and arising under juris-
diction, the Court discerned that to "[a]llow[] a counterclaim to establish
'arising under' jurisdiction would ... contravene the longstanding poli-
cies underlying [the Court's] precedents" in three distinct ways.' 6 First,
allowing a counterclaim to determine jurisdiction runs antithetical to the
fact that the plaintiff is "the master of the complaint.' 65 Allowing a de-
fendant's response to a plaintiff's complaint to be determinative, takes
away the plaintiff's control of which appellate forum the case is ap-
pealed. Including counterclaims under the rule would also destroy the
plaintiff's control over removal jurisdiction.'66 Traditionally, the plaintiff,
being the master of the complaint, could control whether its claims were
heard in federal or state court. For example, by not pleading those claims
based in federal law, the case would be heard in state court. If the well-
pleaded-complaint rule included those claims arising under a defendant's
counterclaim, the plaintiff would lose its ability to raise its claims in the
forum of choice-state or federal.
This lack of control by the plaintiff on the acceptance or rejection of
a state forum leads to the Court second reason for rejecting a well-
pleaded complaint rule that included counterclaims---expansion of re-
moval jurisdiction. 67 The Court noted that "conferring this power upon
the defendant [to control the choice of forum] would radically expand
the class of removable cases contrary to the '[d]ue regard for the rightful
independence of state governments' that [the Courts] cases addressing
removal require.' ,,6' As the Court indicated earlier in Holmes, "arising
under" jurisdiction also controls the removability of a case from state to
federal court.' 69 The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), provides, in
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1894.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1893 n.2.
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relevant part, that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be re-
moved by the defendant.. .,,170 The original jurisdiction of a district
court, in patent cases, and federal question cases in general, is deter-
mined with reference to "arising under" jurisdiction.' 7' If the "arising
under" jurisdiction expands to include defendants' counterclaims, the
potential for more cases to become removable based on a defendants'
pleadings in state court increases.
Third, the Court reasoned that "allowing responsive pleadings by the
defendant to establish 'arising under' jurisdiction would undermine the
clarity and ease of administration of the well-pleaded-complaint doc-
trine, which serves as a 'quick rule of thumb' for resolving jurisdiction
conflicts."'
72
Vornado argued, in the alternative, that "arising under" should have a
unique interpretation when it comes to the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction in order to give effect to Congress's intent to have patent
claims be exclusively reviewed by the Federal Circuit.17 The Court con-
cluded that it could not negate the well understood definition of both
"arising under" in title 28 and the well-pleaded complaint rule.' 74 The
Court felt its hands were further tied by the fact that § 1295(a)(1) defined
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction through its reference to § 1338, which
defines the original jurisdiction of federal district court's over patent law
cases, as well as copyright and trademark cases. ' The Court indicated
that "[i]t would be an unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy to
say that § 1338(a)'s 'arising under' language means one thing (the well-
pleaded-complaint rule) in its own right, but something quite different
([Vornado's] complaint-or-counterclaim rule) when referred to by
§ 1295(a)(1)."' 76 The Court also noted, in a footnote, that the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction could not be determined by looking at what claims
were actually adjudicated, a method the Court expressly rejected in
Christianson.
7
The Court concluded that "[n]ot all cases involving a patent-law
claim fall within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. By limiting the Fed-
eral Circuit's jurisdiction to cases in which district courts would have
jurisdiction under § 1338, Congress referred to a well-established body
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
171. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338.
172. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1894 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 11).
173. Id. at 1894.
174. Id. at 1895.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1894 n.3 (citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 814).
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of law that requires courts to consider whether a patent-law claim ap-
pears on the face of the plaintiff's well pleaded complaint'' The
Federal Circuit's judgment was therefore vacated and the case remanded
to the Federal Circuit with instructions to transfer the case to the Tenth
Circuit.
179
2. Justice Stevens's Concurrence
Three Justices wrote concurrences to the majority's opinion. First,
Justice Stevens, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.'
Agreeing with the majority that the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit is fixed with reference to the jurisdiction of the district court,
Justice Stevens added that appellate jurisdiction does not become fixed
until the filing of a notice of appeal.' Justice Stevens explained that, if
the district court case begins as an antitrust case, but patent claims are
amended to the complaint and pending or decided before an appeal is
taken, then, at the time of appeal, the district court's jurisdiction "aris[es]
under" the patent laws and § 1295(a)(1) provides the Federal Circuit
with appellate jurisdiction.'82 Justice Stevens noted, conversely, that if a
patent claim, originally in the complaint, was "voluntarily dismissed in
advance of trial," the appellate jurisdiction lay in the appropriate regional
circuits, not the Federal Circuit.'83 "Any other approach 'would enable an
unscrupulous plaintiff to manipulate appellate court jurisdiction by the
timing of the amendments to its complaint.' """ Justice Stevens made
these comments because "[t]o the extent that the Court's opinion might
be read as endorsing a contrary result by reason of its reliance on cases
involving removal jurisdiction of the district," he disagreed."'
Justice Stevens then proceeded to agree with the majority's conclu-
sion that the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction "is limited to those
cases in which the patent claim is alleged in either the original complaint
or an amended pleading filed by the plaintiff."' 86 Justice Stevens noted
that such a rule maintains the plaintiff as the master of the complaint and
in control of both the forum for trial and appellate review.'87 Justice Ste-
ven also observed that Congress, in drafting § 1295(a)(1), specifically
left claims arising under copyright and trademark law out of the Federal
178. Id. at 1895.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1895-98 (Stevens, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 1895-96.
182. Id. at 1896.
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J. concurring)).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1896-97.
187. Id. at 1897.
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Circuit's jurisdiction, but still within the district court's original jurisdic-
tion under § 1338(a), demonstrating Congress's desire to have copyright
and trademark claims handled by the regional circuits.188 Justice Stevens
stated that, as the Holmes case demonstrated, copyright and trademark
claims are commonly "bound up with patent counterclaims," and to al-
low such counterclaims to force those cases to the Federal Circuit would
run counter to the specific appellate jurisdiction Congress defined.'89 Jus-
tice Stevens also noted that "the interest in maintaining clarity and
simplicity in rules governing appellate jurisdiction will be served by lim-
iting the number of pleadings that will mandate review in the Federal
Circuit.' ' '9°
Justice Stevens concluded that "other circuits will have some role to
play in the development of this area of law. An occasional conflict in
decision may be useful in identifying questions that merit this Court's
attention. Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with broader juris-
diction will provide an antidote to the rise that the specialized court may
develop an institutional bias."' 9'
3. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
The other concurrence was filed by Justice Ginsburg, who was
joined by Justice O'Connor.9 2 Justice Ginsburg concluded that "when
the claim stated in a compulsory counterclaim 'aris[es] under' federal
patent law and is adjudicated on the merits by a federal district court, the
Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the adjudication
and other determinations made in the same case."'193 Justice Ginsburg
framed the issue before the Court as one regarding a choice of appellate
forum, not trial forum, because the statute at issue, 35 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1), is focused on the Federal Circuit's authority given to it by
Congress.' 94 Justice Ginsburg, however, concurred in the judgment, be-
cause "no patent claim was actually adjudicated."' 95
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1897-98.
192. See id. at 1898 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 1898 (citing Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 741-44). Justice Ginsburg noted that a patent
infringement counterclaim gives a district court an independent jurisdictional basis under 28
U.S.C. § 1338. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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Ill. HOLMES'S IMPACT ON THE UNIFORMITY OF PATENT LAW
The rule of law set forth in Holmes, that both the Federal Circuit's
and district court's jurisdiction over patent cases is governed by the well-
pleaded complaint rule, which does not include counterclaims, has the
potential to disrupt the uniformity in patent law Congress attempted to
create in 1982. 96 Patent law claims, after Holmes, may be decided by
regional circuits. Some patent law claims, as a result of the rule set forth
in Holmes, may never make it into the federal court system, allowing
state courts to decide patent claims. The role of regional circuits and
state courts in the development of patent law has the potential to increase
significantly, which, in turn, will reduce the Federal Circuit's and the
federal judiciary's influence over patent law. Any impact on patent law
uniformity post-Holmes will depend on two factors: (i) the number of the
cases diverted from the Federal Circuit's and federal courts' jurisdiction
and (ii) what control Federal Circuit law will have over patent law deci-
sions made by regional circuits and state courts.
19 7
A. Patent Cases Holmes Diverts From the
Federal Circuit and Federal Courts
1. Federal Circuit's Appellate Jurisdiction over Patent Law Claims
The clearest impact of the Supreme Court's holding in Holmes is
that the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction cannot be based on patent
law counterclaims. This impact has already been witnessed with recent
decisions by the Federal Circuit to transfer cases in light of Holmes. But
the Supreme Court's decision may have an even farther reaching impact.
Holmes solidifies the well-pleaded complaint rule as the test to deter-
mine the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(1). The
impact such a holding will have on other Step One questions, such as
dismissals before appeal and consolidation, is unclear. In addition, the
foundations under the Court's analysis in Holmes, particularly the
196. See Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg. Corp., 294 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Dyk, J., concurring) (noting that "the recent decision of the Supreme Court in [Holmes] may
make ... uniformity more elusive"); Janice M. Mueller, "Interpretive Necromancy" or Pru-
dent Patent Policy? The Supreme Court's "Arising Under" Blunder in Holmes Group v.
Vornado, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRoP. L. 57, 59 (2002) ("The decision in Holmes
Group resurrects the specter of regional circuit-specific, non-uniform patent jurisprudence and
the potential for forum shopping that entails, the very problem that the Federal Circuit was
created to remedy."); Edward G. Poplawski, Patent Litigation After Vornado, 725 PL/Pat 407,
420 (Sept.-Oct. 2002) ("Time will only tell whether the state of patent law [after Vornado]
will eventually return to the way it was before 1982.").
197. See Poplawski, supra note 196, at 420 ("The level of unpredictability in patent law
may largely depend on whether the regional circuits apply Federal Circuit precedent or choose
to apply their own law to the cases before them.").
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Court's reliance on removal case law, may impact the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence as to whether dismissed or amended patent claims can
form the basis of appellate jurisdiction. The effects Holmes has on the
current law governing the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction will be
explored in detail below.
But, it is important to note that Holmes did not address any of the
case law regarding Step Two of "arising under" jurisdiction-whether
the substance of the claims before the district court fall within the Fed-
eral Circuit's appellate jurisdiction.' The decision in Holmes focused
solely on Step One-the scope of the lens through which patent law
claims may be found. Therefore, the two possible criteria under which a
claim may substantively arise under patent law, enumerated in
Christianson, remain unchanged. '99 In addition, frivolous patent law
claims, no matter how they are presented, still cannot form the basis for
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction.
a. Issue versus Case Jurisdiction
While the Supreme Court did not directly address this issue in
Holmes, it stayed true to its statement in Christianson that the point of
reference for determining Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction is the
"well-pleaded complaint, not the well-tried case."'2 °° The majority in
Holmes made their comment in response to Justice Ginsburg's statement
in her concurrence that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction only over a
patent claim that was "actually adjudicated." 20 ' The Supreme Court, in
Holmes, continued its focus on the jurisdiction of the district court, as
opposed to the specific substance of the appeal. If the Supreme Court
believed issue jurisdiction was appropriate, the Supreme Court did not
have to decide whether counterclaims can confer jurisdiction and simply
stop at the fact that only Holmes's trade dress claim was on appeal.2 2
Holmes left the case law in this area of Federal Circuit appellate jurisdic-
tion jurisprudence undisturbed. Furthermore, footnote 3 of the Court's
decision can be read as reaffirming that the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction is over the entire case, not just patent issues on appeal.203
198. See Poplawski, supra note 196, at 419.
199. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893 (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809).
In addition, the Federal Circuit has concluded, even after Holmes, the court has jurisdic-
tion over those appeals where the "well-pleaded complaint sought declarations of patent
noninfringement." Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
200. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1894 n.3 (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 814).
201. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1894 n.3.
202. See id. at 1893-84.
203. See id. at 1894 n.3.
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b. Counterclaims
The Supreme Court's decision in Holmes expressly held that the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction is found in the district court's
"arising under" jurisdiction, which is governed, at least in part, by the
well-pleaded complaint rule. 204 The Court also stated, for the first time,
that a counterclaim cannot form the basis for "arising under" jurisdiction
because it violates the well-pleaded complaint rule. 5
Therefore, a patent law counterclaim cannot create Federal Circuit
appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether it is compulsory or permis-
sive.26 The Federal Circuit has already applied Holmes to cases in which
the only patent law claim in an appealed case was a counterclaim. 7 In
Telecomm, the Federal Circuit raised the question of appellate jurisdic-
tion sua sponte after oral argument due to the Supreme Court's decision
in Holmes.'°s A group of independent service organizations ("ISO") sued
Siemens alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization under
the Sherman Act.2 Siemens counterclaimed for patent and copyright
infringement. 2'0 The ISO's appealed a jury verdict of patent and copy-
right infringement and the grant of summary judgment in Siemens's
favor on ISO's Sherman Act claims.2" The Federal Circuit noted that
"[w]hen the ISOs originally filed the appeal, [the Federal Circuit's] ju-
risdiction was predicated on the patent infringement counterclaim. 2 2
But, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes that "is directly
on point," the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, and
thus the case was transferred to the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1631.2"3
204. Id. at 1893-94. "Arising under" jurisdiction also requires there the claims found in
the complaint "establis[h] either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the
plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
patent law." Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809.
205. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893-95.
206. The Supreme Court completely rejected counterclaims, without qualification, from
meeting the well-pleaded complaint rule. See id. at 1893-95; see also Mueller, supra note 196,
at 57-58; Poplawski, supra note 196, at 419-20.
207. See Telecomm Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc., 295 F.3d
1249, 1251-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Medigene AG v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 02-1235, 02-
1308, 2002 WL 1478674, *1 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2002) (unpublished order); see also Mattel,
Inc. v. Lehman, No. 02-1307, 49 Fed. Appx. 889, 889 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2002) (noting that,
after Holmes, the "court does not have jurisdiction over claims presented in an answer or
counterclaim if the complaint does not involve patent issues.").
208. See Telecomm, 295 F.3d at 1251.
209. See id. at 1251.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 1251-52 (citing Aerojet, 895 F.2d 739 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
213. Id. at 1252.
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A similar result was reached by the Federal Circuit in its unpub-
lished decision in Medigene.1 4 The only apparent patent claims in
Medigene were Loyola University's counterclaims seeking a declaration
that Medigene is not a co-inventor of a particular U.S. patent.2 5 The Fed
eral Circuit, "[u]pon consideration of the parties' consent motion ...
under the principles of [Holmes]" transferred the appeal to the Seventh
Circuit.216 Presumably, the court concluded that, based on Holmes, the
patent law counterclaim, as in Telecomm, did not confer Federal Circuit
appellate jurisdiction.
c. Amendments and Dismissals
The Supreme Court specifically did not answer whether "the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction is fixed with reference to the complaint as initially
filed or whether an actual or constructive amendment to the complaint
raising a patent-law claim can provide the foundation for the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction. 21 7 However, the Supreme Court's holding that the
well-pleaded complaint rule governs both Federal Circuit and district
court jurisdiction over patent law claims provides some guidance on how
the addition or dismissal of patent law claims before appeal effect juris-
diction. Furthermore, Justice Stevens's statements in his concurrence
support the current case law on this subject.28
An amended complaint can form the basis for federal question juris-
diction.21 9 An amended complaint can also establish a federal district120
court's removal jurisdiction over a state case. Thus, just as an amended
complaint confers district court jurisdiction, such a complaint can confer
214. See Medigene, 2002 WL 1478674, at *1.
215. See Medigene AG v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 98 C 2026, 2001 WL 1636425,
*1-2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2001).
216. See Medigene, 2002 WL 1478674, at *1.
217. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893 n.l.
218. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1896 (Stevens, J. concurring).
219. See WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3566 (3d
ed. 1998); Coastal Corp. v. Tx. E. Corp., 869 F.2d 817, 821 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that
"Coastal's amended complaint filed on January 31 conferred jurisdiction on the district court
at least from thence forward"); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 506-08 (5th
Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Appellant's
amended complaint had been artfully pleaded to avoid federal jurisdiction."), overruled on
other grounds by Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 (1988).
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ("If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,
a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, ex-
cept that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of
this title [diversity jurisdiction] more than 1 year after commencement of the action.") (em-
phasis added); see also Ayers v. General Motors Corp., 234 F3d 514, 517-518, 518 n.7 (1 1th
Cir. 2000).
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appellate jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit. The decision in Holmes ties
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction to district court original and re-
moval jurisdiction. Thus, Holmes reinforces earlier case law that the
amended complaint can establish Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction.2 '
Justice Stevens came to the same conclusion in his concurrence, noting
that the Federal Circuit, as well as a district court, would have patent
jurisdiction over a case when "an amendment to the complaint added a
patent claim. 222 Holmes does not disturb the prior case law holding that
patent claim amendments confer jurisdiction.2 3
The state of the law regarding patent law claims dismissed before
appeal is not as clear after Holmes. The focus on the district court's
jurisdiction over the case in Holmes supports the current law governing
dismissals. As the Federal Circuit observed in Nilssen and Zenith, a
dismissal "with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the merits, not
an amendment of the complaint."22' For such a dismissal to act as an
adjudication, the district court necessarily must have jurisdiction over the
patent claim. A dismissal without prejudice operates like an amendment
to the complaint, leaving the parties "in the same legal position with
respect to the [dismissed] claims as if they had never been filed. 225
Claims dismissed without prejudice cannot serve as a jurisdictional basis
over the case.226 Therefore, by looking at the foundation for the Federal
221. There is still a question as to whether constructive amendments to a complaint can
create Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893 n. 1. The removal
statutes look to "an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper" to ascertained whether
removal jurisdiction is present. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); see also Eyak Native Village v. Exxon
Corp., 25 E3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 1994). While based, in part, on statute, district court's can
exercise removal jurisdiction based on evidence of a federal question not formally introduced
by amending the complaint, suggesting that after Holmes the Federal Circuit should be able to
do the same-exercising appellate jurisdiction when it appears, from any paper, that a ques-
tion of patent law has been presented by the plaintiff. Holmes identified the link between
removal jurisdiction and the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at
1892-94.
222. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1896 (Stevens, J. concurring).
223. Notably, just as with original counterclaims, amendments to counterclaims cannot
create Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1894 (noting that a
counterclaim cannot form the basis for "arising under" jurisdiction under the well-pleaded
complaint rule).
224. Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1346; see also Nilssen, 203 F3d at 784-85.
225. Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 784-85 (citing MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
IT 41.40[9][b], 41.50[7][b] (3d ed. 1999); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, §§ 2367, 2373 (2d ed. 1994)); see also Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1346; Gronholz, 836
F.2d at 516.
226. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, also focused on whether the dismissal was vol-
untary as a factor to determine whether the appeal should be directed to the Federal Circuit or
regional circuit. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1896 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Federal Circuit, and
other circuits, have also focused on the voluntariness of the dismissal. See Gronholz, 836 F.2d
at 517-18 (noting that the dismissal was voluntary); Schwartzkopf, 800 F.2d at 243-45; Den-
bicare U.S.A., 84 F.3d at 1147-48. In fact, the Ninth Circuit, in Denbicare, found no appellate
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Circuit's appellate jurisdiction identified in Holmes-the district court's
jurisdiction--dismissals with prejudice of patent law claims still confer
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction after Holmes, while dismissals
without prejudice do not.227 So, as explained in Justice Stevens's
example, if a patent claim is "voluntarily dismissed in advance of trial, it
would seem ... clear that the appeal should be taken to the appropriate
regional court of appeals rather than the Federal Circuit."
28
But, as Justice Stevens suggested, the majority's reliance on removal
law in Holmes "might be read as endorsing a contrary result.229 Removal
jurisdiction is determined by looking at the complaint at the time the
case is removed to the federal district court .2 " Therefore, if, at the time
of removal, a claim falling under federal jurisdiction is not present in the
complaint, the case is not within the federal district court's jurisdiction.'
This analysis, applied in the context of Federal Circuit appellate
jurisdiction, may suggest that if the complaint, at the time it is originally
filed, contains a patent law claim, the case must be appealed to the
Federal Circuit, regardless of whether the patent law claim is later
dismissed without prejudice.232 Such a result would be contrary to current
case law on dismissals prior to appeal. However, it is unlikely that this
analysis will trump the fact that, at the relevant time period of
determining appellate jurisdiction-the time of the appeal-the district
court's jurisdiction is not based on a patent law claim. 33 As Justice
Stevens indicated, the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction is "fixed"
at the time the "notice of appeal is filed.'' 23 Therefore, if removal case
law is to be applied, it should be applied at the time of appeal to the
Federal Circuit, not when the case begins in the federal district court.
When applied in this manner, removal case law supports the Federal
jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit for case where the patent claim was dismissed voluntarily
but with prejudice. See Denbicare U.S.A., 84 F.3d at 1147-48) (the court also focused on the
separation of patent claims from non-patent claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 54(b)).
227. Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 783-85; Zenith, 182 F3d at 1346-47.
228. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1896 (citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 823-24 (Stevens, J.
concurring)).
229. Id.
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987);
Ayres, 234 E3d at 517-18.
231. See id.; see also Boelens, 759 F.2d at 506-08.
232. By applying removal case law, the decision in Holmes may also suggest that those
cases in which patent claims are dismissed with prejudice before appeal, and therefore no
longer found in the well-pleaded complaint, do not fall within the Federal Circuit's jurisdic-
tion.
233. As noted supra, the district court's jurisdiction is based on patent claims dismissed
with prejudice before appeal. See Zenith, 182 E3d at 1346-47.
234. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1896 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Griggs v. Provident Con-
sumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58-59 (1982) (per curiam)).
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Circuit not having appellate jurisdiction over those cases where patent
law claims were dismissed without prejudice.23 ' Based on the Supreme
Court's analysis in Holmes, the case law governing the Federal Circuit's
appellate jurisdiction over cases in which patent claims are dismissed
prior to appeal is left undisturbed. 6
d. Consolidated Cases
While the Supreme Court in Holmes was not confronted with a con-
solidated action, the holding in Holmes will, at the very least, require the
Federal Circuit to revisit the scope of its appellate jurisdiction over a
consolidated case. One of the Federal Circuit's rationales for exercising
appellate jurisdiction over a consolidated case that contained a patent
law claim was specifically negated by Holmes. In Innotron, the Federal
Circuit analogized a patent law-based complaint in a consolidated action
to that of a counterclaim and noted that "[i]t would, of course, be incon-
gruous to hold that consolidation of a separate suit, as in Interpart, is
distinct, in relation to this court's jurisdiction, from the presence of a
counterclaim raising the same allegation." '237 The incongruity is no longer
an issue after Holmes, considering that counterclaims now cannot confer
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction. While this was only part of the
Federal Circuit's reasoning for exercising jurisdiction over the consoli-
dated case, the change in law introduced by Holmes brings such
appellate jurisdiction into question.
Consolidation, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a),238 can take many forms,
from consolidating cases at various stages of discovery to consolidating
cases for trial.2 9 Rule 42(a) can even result in the filing of a consolidated
pleading.2 ' Consolidation of separate cases "does not merge the suits
235. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 784-85 (denying appellate jurisdiction over a case in which
the patent law claims were dismissed without prejudice before appeal to the Federal Circuit).
236. See Poplawski, supra note 196, at 422 (coming to a similar conclusion-that
Holmes will not effect the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction over cases involving dis-
missed patent claims).
237. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1081.
238. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) reads:
Consolidation.
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the ac-
tions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
239. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2382 (3d ed. 1998).
240. See MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 41.13[5][a] (3d ed. 2000); see also
Katz v. Reality Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354, 1358 (2d Cir. 1975).
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into a single cause of action."2"1 Cases maintain their own separate iden-
tity when consolidated,"2 and each case must have its own jurisdictional
basis 4 3 However, while still treated as separate cases, most circuits, for
practical reasons, prefer that the complete consolidated case be treated as
a single case for purposes of appellate review.2" This requirement for a
single appeal is especially true when cases are consolidated for all parts
of the litigation.24'
Taking the basic case law governing consolidation, and applying the
holding in Holmes, the Federal Circuit clearly has jurisdiction over the
patent law based complaint in a consolidated case.2 6 Based on its com-
plaint, the individual case still arises, at least in part, under § 1338(a),
meeting the criteria set forth in Holmes.47 The decision in Holmes fo-
cused on the well-pleaded complaint rule, and a case that is consolidated
and includes a complaint alleging patent infringement would meet that
rule.24 Furthermore, the district court's jurisdiction over such a com-
plaint is based, at least in part, on § 1338. 249
The tougher question presented by consolidation is whether the
Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the non-patent based
complaints. Prior to Holmes, the Federal Circuit, and other regional
250
circuits, have exercised jurisdiction over all of the consolidated case.20
The jurisdiction of each complaint, however, is considered separately.'
One circuit observed that the Federal Circuit's case law requiring the
complete consolidated case to fall within the court's appellate
241. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933); see also WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2382; MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 42.13[2] (3d ed. 2000).
242. See, e.g., Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 750, 752
(1 I th Cir. 1998) ("[Clonsolidation of cases under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 does not strip the cases of
their individual identities."); MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 42.13[2] (3d ed. 2000).
243. See Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1977); but see Dooley v.
United Tech. Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 81 (D.D.C. 1992); MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 42.13[4][b] (3d ed. 2000) (noting that ancillary jurisdiction may allow a federal court to hear
a state law claim that shares a common nucleus of operative facts with a federal law claim).
244. Huene v. U. S., 743 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1994).
245. Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 822 F.2d 707,709-10 (7th Cir. 1987);
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2386 (3d ed. 1998).
246. See Poplawski, supra note 196, at 422.
247. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893-94 (defining the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction
with respect to what is plead on the face of the plaintiff's complaint).
248. Id.
249. Tank Insulation, 104 F.3d at 85 ("So long as the actions were consolidated, section
1295 unquestionably vested the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction of the entire ac-
tion.").
250. See Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1080-81; Interpart, 777 F.2d at 680-81; Wang Laborato-
ries, 926 F.2d at 93-94.
251. See Cole, 563 F.2d at 38.
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jurisdiction252 runs afoul of this distinct jurisdictional nature of each
consolidated complaint. 3 A regional circuit court even held that if the
patent case is just consolidated for pretrial purposes, appeals concerning
the non-patent case should be heard by the appropriate regional circuit.24
Strictly applying Holmes to these cases would result in the non-patent
complaints, which are consolidated with patent-based complaints, to be
appealed to regional circuits, not the Federal Circuit. The non-patent
case, which has its own separate jurisdiction, does not meet the well-
pleaded complaint rule and thus does not fall within the district court's
§ 1338 jurisdiction. Basically, considering that each case is treated
separately, the well-pleaded complaint rule may be applied to each case
subject to consolidation, and those complaints that fail to assert a patent
law claim may be directed to regional circuits.
But, separating the consolidated case for appeal purposes creates
many of the problems that issue jurisdiction generates. Separate appeals
that, by rule, involve common questions of law or fact,255 create the po-
tential for inconsistent decisions on common issues between the cases.
For this reason, circuit courts will likely apply the same pragmatic ap-
proach utilized most often in consolidated cases-requiring the
judgments from each case that is consolidated to be combined for ap-
peal. Thus, while the rule of law established in Holmes may dictate that
appeals from consolidated cases be separated, federal courts may, in
practice, combine the appeals to the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, even
if such consolidated cases are separated, the patent-based complaints
will still be appealed to the Federal Circuit, preventing such patent law
claims from falling outside the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction.
2. Federal Courts' Jurisdiction over Patent Law Claims
While, at first blush, Holmes appears to have implications only for
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court's decision also ef-
fects the scope of patent cases, and copyright and trademark cases, that
are removable to federal district court. As the Court noted in Holmes, the
well-pleaded complaint rule helps define "arising under" jurisdiction,
which is used in determining Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction under§ 1295(a)(1) and district court jurisdiction under § 1338.256 The well-
pleaded complaint rule, therefore, limits a district court's jurisdiction
252. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1079-81; Interpart, 777 F.2d at 680-81.
253. Dorf & Stanton, 56 E3d at 15 (noting that the "Federal Circuit appears to attach
greater significance to consolidation than our decision in Cole suggests).
254. See FMC Corp., 830 F.2d at 772-73.
255. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
256. Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893-94.
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over patent, copyright, and trademark claims, as well as "whether a
case is removable from state to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a)."258 After Holmes, removal of a case from state to federal court
cannot be based on a counterclaim asserting a patent, copyright, or
trademark claim because such counterclaims do not "aris[e] under" fed-
eral law pursuant to the well-pleaded complaint rule.259
Many regional circuit and district courts, before Holmes, held that a
counterclaim cannot form the basis for removal from state to federal
court.260 District courts specifically concluded, before Holmes, that patent
law counterclaims do not create removal jurisdiction over the state court
cases.26' The Supreme Court's decision in Holmes solidifies this case law.
District courts have already cited Holmes for the proposition that "a fed-
eral defense nor counterclaim will create removal jurisdiction., 262
Therefore, while it may have been unclear prior to Holmes, Holmes pre-
vents defendants from removing cases to federal court in which patent,
copyright, and trademark counterclaims are present.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 1893 n.2. Section 1441(b) employs "arising under" language, stating that:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim
or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable
without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (emphasis
added).
259. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893-94; see also, R.F. Shinn Contractors, Inc. v. Shinn,
No. 1:01CV00750, 2002 WL 31942135, *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2002) (finding that, in light of
the holding in Holmes, "[d]efendant's counterclaim for patent infringement cannot serve as [a]
federal jurisdictional hook").
260. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Elefant, 790 F2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 1986); Takeda
v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing numerous
cases supporting the proposition that "[r]emovability cannot be created by defendant pleading
a counterclaim presenting a federal question"); Duckson, Carlson, Bassinger, LLC v. Lake
Bank, 139 R Supp. 2d 1117, 1118-19 (D. Minn. 2001) (finding no removal jurisdiction based
on counterclaims and a third party defendants' claims that were not separate and independent
from the other claims in the case).
261. See Commercial Sales Network v. Sadler-Cisar, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 756, 758-60
(N.D. Ohio 1991) (granting a motion for remand because plaintiff's complaint contained no
patent law claims and defendants' counter-suit, handled as counterclaims, could not form the
basis for removal); Coditron Corp. v. AFA Protective Systems, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 158, 160
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that "the answer and [patent law] counterclaims of AFA do not pro-
vide a basis for removal").
262. See Flanders Diamond USA, Inc. v. Nat'l Diamond Syndicate, Inc., No. 02 C 4605,
2002 WL 31681474 *2-4 (N.D. II1. Nov. 27, 2002) (denying removal to federal court because
there were no claims arising under patent law in the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint); R.E
Shinn, 2002 WL 31942135 at *2 (remanding a case that included a patent infringement coun-
terclaim to state court because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction); United Mutual Houses v.
Andujar, No. 02 CIV.3503(SAS), 2002 WL 1467807, *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2002); see also In
re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1408(ILG), 2002 WL 1962125,*4 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 26, 2002) (citing Holmes for the proposition that "answers and counterclaims cannot
serve as the basis for 'arising under' jurisdiction") (patent case).
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Holmes has also brought into question the federal district court's ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the areas of law enumerated in § 1338(a). Prior
to Holmes, many state courts concluded that federal district courts had
exclusive jurisdiction over all patent and copyright claims.263 State courts
decided that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the federal courts even for pat-
ent or copyright counterclaims. 64 Again, due to its holding that
counterclaims do not "aris[e] under" federal law, Holmes may have also
dissolved the exclusive jurisdiction district court's enjoyed over counter-
claims including patent and copyrights, as listed in § 1338(a).2 65 The
second sentence of § 1338(a) defines the scope of a federal district
court's exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases to be the same as a dis-
trict courts "original jurisdiction" over "any civil action arising under"
patent laws. If a case in which the only patent claim is presented in a
counterclaim does not qualify as a "civil action arising under" patent
law, then, based on the plain reading of the statute, § 1338(a) does not
confer the federal court with exclusive jurisdiction over the case.' 66
The Indiana Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in Green v.
Hendrickson Publishers, Inc.267 Hendrickson Publishers sued Mary and
Jay Green in Tippecanoe Superior Court in Indiana for breach of a pub-
lishing contract. 26 The Greens' counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, that
Hendrickson Publishers violated their copyrights on the books covered
by the publishing contract. 16 The Greens attempted to remove the case to
federal district court, but the federal court remanded "because a defen-
dant's counterclaim based on federal law does not confer federal court
263. See Tewarson v. Simon, 750 N.E.2d 176, 183 (Ct. App. Ohio 2001) (finding state
court lacked jurisdiction over copyright counterclaim because federal courts have exclusivejurisdiction "over claims arising under federal copyright law"); EMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Lincoln,
691 So.2d 547, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that "the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim because it involved rights arising out of the federal
copyright laws and pled copyright infringement"); Superior Clay Corp. v. Clay Sewer Pipe
Assn., 215 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ct. Common Plea Ohio 1963); Pleatmaster v. Consolidated
Trimming Corp., Ill U.S.P.Q. 124 (Supr. Ct. N.Y 1956); Am. Home Products Corp. v. Nor-
den Laboratories, No. 11615, 1992 WL 368604, *3 (Del. Ch. 1992) (unpublished opinion).
264. See id.
265. Section 1338(a) excludes trademarks from the exclusive jurisdiction given to fed-
eral district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
266. Some may argue that the second sentence in § 1338(a), which defines the scope of
exclusive jurisdiction, refers to a federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over specific claims, not
the whole case. However, the plain language of § 1338(a) defines both original and exclusive
jurisdiction in terms of the "civil action:' not particular claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
Therefore, any effect Holmes has on the district court's "arising under" jurisdiction over patent
and copyright cases also impacts the federal court system's exclusive jurisdiction over such
cases.
267. Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784 (Ind. 2002).
268. Id. at 787.
269. Id.
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jurisdiction., 270 Hendrickson then argued that the Greens' counterclaims,
now amended, were preempted by federal copyright law and the state
court had no jurisdiction to decide them. 27 ' The trial court agreed and
granted partial summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed
"holding that the copyright issues were merely tangential to the contract
claims, and the trial court had jurisdiction over the offending portions of
the counterclaim., 272 The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and
initially noted that the appeal presented two issues: "whether the Greens
have a valid state law claim" and "what court may entertain the Greens'
claim. ,
273
In response to the first question, the Indiana Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Greens' counterclaim was preempted by federal
copyright law and therefore the only relief available to the Greens is un-
der the federal Copyright Act.274 This brought the Indiana Supreme Court
to the second question, the question on which Holmes may have an im-
pact-can a state court hear a copyright counterclaim? 275 The Indiana
Supreme Court noted that "until very recently the logic and language of
a consistent body of federal decisions appeared to preclude a state court
from entertaining a counterclaim under copyright law. 276 This body of
case law, in the Indiana Supreme Court's eyes, is now "trumped by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Holmes," opening the door for "a state court
[to] entertain a counterclaim under patent or copyright law. 277 The Indi-
ana Supreme Court noted that, under Holmes, a counterclaim does not
confer "arising under" jurisdiction under § 1338(a), and therefore, coun-
terclaims are not within the exclusive jurisdiction defined by
§ 1338(a).278 The Court, therefore, remanded the case to the trial court to
decide the copyright counterclaim. 9
3. Cases Diverted from Federal Circuit
Initially, as noted above, all cases where the only patent law claim is
a counterclaim are now, as a result of Holmes, out of the Federal
270. Id.
271. Id. at 787-88.
272. Id. at 788 (citing Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 815-824-25
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).
273. Id. at 788.
274. Id. at 788-90.
275. Id. at 790-91.
276. id. at 792 (discussing Aerojet and the following cases that interpreted district court
"arising under" jurisdiction in § 1338(a) to include counterclaims).
277. Id. at 793.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 793-94.
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210Circuit's hands, and potentially, federal jurisdiction. Antitrust cases,
trade dress and trademark cases,28 ' copyright cases, 282 and trade secret
cases23 invoking compulsory patent counterclaims will now be reviewed
by regional circuits. Holmes, however, as discussed supra, will unlikely
change any of the other case law regarding which patent law claims meet
the well-pleaded complaint rule. In the end, it appears that Holmes will
only take patent law counterclaims out of the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction.2 8 The reported cases prior to Holmes which based Federal
Circuit jurisdiction on patent law counterclaims total less then ten.
While this is an insignificant number, the real difficulty in trying to
determine the number of cases that will be diverted from the Federal
Circuit is determining if litigants will bring suits including, for example,
antitrust claims, that force compulsory patent law counterclaims which
will now fall outside the scope of the Federal Circuit's scope of review.8
If a potential infringer believes the threat of a patent suit is imminent,
that infringer may file suit first, alleging a non-patent claim that "arises
out of the [same] transaction or occurrence" 86 as the patent issues so that
the patent claims are tied up as compulsory counterclaims in a lawsuit
that will be appealed to a regional circuit.2 7 A similar strategy may take
place at the state court level, preventing compulsory patent or copyright
280. See, e.g., Telecomm, 295 F.3d at 1251-52, Independent Serv. Organizations, 203
F.3d at 1324, Xtex, 825 F.2d at 604-07.
281. See, e.g, Holmes, 99 F Supp. 2d at 1141.
282. See, e.g., DSC Communications, 170 E3d at 1358-59.
283. See, e.g., Leatherman Tool Group Inc., 131 F3d at 1013-15; Aerojet, 895 F.2d at
745.
284. Obviously, patent law counterclaims that arise in cases including patent-law based
complaints will fall within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction.
285. As a result of the decision in Independent Serv. Organizations, it is more likely that
alleged infringers with antitrust claims will try to avoid the Federal Circuit. See generally
Stempel & Terzaken, Casting a Long IP Shadow over Antitrust Jurisprudence: The Federal
Circuit's Expanding Jurisdictional Reach, 69 ANTITRUST B. J. 711 (2002).
286. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) defines compulsory counterclaims. Rule 13(a) reads:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court can-
not acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time
the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or
(2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other process
by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on
that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
287. Practitioners have already recognized that the rule in Holmes provides "opportuni-
ties for forum and claim shopping for both prospective plaintiffs and defendants." Poplawski,
supra note 196, at 420-21.
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claims from being tried in federal court.2 s Thus, while the historical
number of cases that Holmes would divert from the Federal Circuit is
small, litigants may use the rule in Holmes to shop for certain regional
circuits or state courts, leaving a significant universe of cases that will be
diverted in the future. 2 9 History suggests that patent litigants will engage
in forum shopping if given the opportunity.
Such attempts at forum shopping will likely prove successful. Com-
pulsory counterclaims will be the tool litigants will use to force patent
law claims to be presented in responsive pleadings that cannot, after
Holmes, be the basis for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction or district
court removal and exclusive jurisdiction. Empirically, patent law coun-
terclaims have been found to be compulsory in response to many different
causes of action. For example, claims of patent infringement can, in cer-
tain circumstances, "arise[] out of the [same] transaction or occurrence" as
claims of antitrust2 9 0 unfair competition, 9' trademark infringement,292 trade
dress infringement,293 and trade secret misappropriation.9 In the appropri-
ate factual setting, when claims such as these are asserted against a patent
holder in federal court, the patentee is required to assert any patent claims
288. If the counterclaims are permissive, they do not need to be asserted in response to
the non-patent claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b) ("A pleading may state as a counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim.").
289. Furthermore, even if the number of cases diverted from the Federal Circuit post-
Holmes is small, the cases that are diverted "can be relatively high-profile,' involving impor-
tant antitrust/patent questions. Mueller, supra note 196, at 69.
290. See, e.g., Telecomm, 295 F.3d at 1251-52; Xtex, 825 F.2d at 604-07. But see
Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 70 F.3d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1995).
291. See, e.g, Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1892 (indicated that the "[r]espondent's answer as-
serting a compulsory counterclaim alleging patent infringement").
292. See, e.g. id.
293. See, e.g. id.
294. See, e.g., Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 745.
In these types of cases, it may be argued that the claims in the complaint that force a pat-
ent law counterclaim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) cause the complaint itself to present a
substantial and necessary question of patent law-qualifying the case for Federal Circuit ap-
pellate jurisdiction under the second category described by the Supreme Court in
Christianson. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808-09. If a patent law claim "arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim[s]" in the
complaint, then it is possible that the complaint itself requires a substantial and necessary
question of patent law to be answered. The case under Category II of Step Two, therefore, falls
under the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction regardless of the ruling in Holmes.
However, a plaintiff can avoid this result and still engage in forum shopping. "[A) plaintiff
who desires to avoid Federal Circuit jurisdiction may now more easily defeat Federal Circuit
jurisdiction under [Category II] by alleging some alternative theories in its non-patent claims
for which the right to relief does not necessarily depend on resolution of validity or another
patent issue'" Poplawski, supra note 196, at 419-20. The presence of such alternative theories
cause the complaint to not meet the requirements of the second category enumerated in
Christianson. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808-09.
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required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) or be precluded from asserting such a
claim in a future suit. 295 An alleged infringer, faced with the possibility of
being sued for patent infringement can, after Holmes, file suit in federal
court alleging claims that require the patentee to respond with her patent
claims, which now will go to a regional circuit, not the Federal Circuit.
Even more disturbing is the possibility of the patentee being forced
to present patent law claims in state court without the ability to either
remove such claims to federal court or, at the very least, deny the state
court jurisdiction to adjudicate the patent claims. Similar to the scenario
that diverts the patentee from the Federal Circuit, a patentee can be
forced to file her patent law claims, if they are compulsory under the
respective state law or rule, in response to a complaint filed in state
court. 96 A complaint filed in state court asserting state unfair competition
claims, for example, may require the responding patentee to file any fed-
eral patent law claims in state court. If the counterclaims are compulsory,
failure to assert such claims in state court will bar the patentee from pre-
senting them in a future federal suit.297 After Holmes, the scope of forum
shopping expands to more then just choices between regional circuits
and includes forum choice between the state and federal level. It is likely
that a patentee, after Holmes, may, in addition to not seeing the Federal
Circuit on appeal, not even get a chance to litigate her patent law coun-
terclaims in federal court.
B. Choice of Patent Law for Regional Circuits and State Courts
Considering that cases containing patent law claims will be diverted
from the Federal Circuit, and the federal courts, as a result of the holding
in Holmes,298 the next question presented is what law these courts will
apply to the diverted claims. The choice of law made by regional circuits
and state courts is the final measure of Holmes impact on the develop-
ment and uniformity of patent law. Pursuant to the Evans Act, 9 regional
295. If a defendant fails to plead a compulsory counterclaim, the defendant is barred
from raising the claim in the a future suit. See Vivid Technologies, Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g,
Inc., 200 F3d 795, 801 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Poplawski, supra note 196, at 421; 6 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1417, at 129 (2d ed.1990); MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.14[1]-[2] (3d ed.
2000) (noting that such a bar is supported under either the waiver theory or claim preclusion
theory).
296. A defendant's failure to bring compulsory counterclaims in a state court action bars
bringing the claim in a subsequent federal court action. See Montgomery Ward Dev. Corp. v.
Juster, 932 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (11th Cir. 1991); MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 13.14[1] (3d ed. 2000).
297. See id.
298. See supra.
299. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
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circuits are not bound by the legal holdings on issues of law decided by
their sister courts.3m Furthermore, Congress, when forming the Federal
Circuit in 1982, passed no statutes requiring that Federal Circuit law
control decisions by the regional circuits on patent issues. Therefore, at
the outset, there is no steadfast requirement that regional circuits follow
the patent decisions of the Federal Circuit. Statements by Justice Stevens
in Holmes go a step further, affirmatively instructing regional circuits to
make independent decisions on patent law claims. Justice Stevens indi-
cated that, in light of the holding in Holmes, "other circuits will have
some role to play in the development of [patent] law" and that "[a]n oc-
casional conflict in decisions may be useful in identifying questions [of
patent law] that merits this Court's attention."' ' The choice of law re-
gional circuits make with regard to patent claims will trickle down to
federal district courts, who, when handling a patent law counterclaim,
for example, will look to regional circuit law, instead of Federal Circuit
law, for precedential authority. Based on Justice Stevens statements and
the lack of control over the law applied by regional circuits and state
courts, Federal Circuit law will have little to no influence on decisions
made outside its appellate jurisdiction.
To complicate matters further, regional circuits have their own patent
law jurisprudence, developed before the creation of the Federal Circuit.0 2
The amount of regional circuit caselaw is extensive and covers many
substantive areas of patent law. Some of the regional circuit precedent
varies dramatically from current Federal Circuit caselaw. For example,
prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit, regional circuits employed
a subjective test for obviousness3 3 and gave little deference to the
USPTO's decision to grant the issuance of a patent.3" This pre-Federal
Circuit patent law led to uncertain and non-uniform results amongst dis-
trict courts and circuits.3 3 Some regional circuits also held that business
300. See Schaffner, Federal Circuit "Choice of Law": Erie Through the Looking Glass,
81 IowA L. REV. 1173, 11195 (May 1996) (noting that "each circuit court of appeals is free to
interpret federal law independent of the other circuits").
301. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1897-98 (Stevens, J., concurring).
302. The Federal Circuit did not adopt this regional circuit law as controlling precedent,
but did adopted the case law of the CCPA and Court of Claims as controlling. See South Corp.
v. U.S., 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
303. See Markey, The Phoenix Court, 10 AIPLA Q. J. 227, 232 (1982) (noting that re-
gional circuits asked whether the patent was obvious to an "ordinary designer" or an "ordinary
intelligent man"); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 14-17 (noting how the Federal Circuit
corrected the problems with these obviousness tests).
304. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 18-20 (noting that the Federal Circuit revived the
presumption of validity).
305. See id.
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methods were not patentable statutory subject matter,3 6 coming to an
opposite conclusion to that of the Federal Circuit 307 Even individual re-
gional circuits had a "morass of conflict" internally with regard to their
holdings on patent law.308
Under basic rules of precedent, regional circuits would be bound by
this prior patent law precedent, to the extent such precedent is consistent
with current Supreme Court decisions.3°9 Regional circuits would have to
go en banc to divert from their previous patent law precedent and follow
a contrary holding by the Federal Circuit.30 These institutional barriers,
when combined with the independence given to the regional circuits by
the Evarts Act and the comments made by Justice Stevens, create an en-
vironment that forces regional circuits, at least initially, to speak
independently on patent law issues funneled their way after Holmes. "[I]t
can be expected that regional circuits may incrementally develop and
apply their own patent jurisprudence."3' The potential exists for regional
circuits to revert patent law to its circa 1982 state. This reversion to pre-
Federal Circuit patent law will filter its way down from regional circuits
to federal district courts adjudicating patent counterclaims" 2 to state
courts handling similar counterclaims.33
IV. NON-UNIFORMITY IN PATENT LAW
As discussed supra, the Supreme Court's holding in Holmes will
divert patent law claims away from the Federal Circuit to regional
circuits and state courts In these regional circuits and state courts, pre-
Federal Circuit caselaw on patent issues will again control and these
courts will resume their independent development of patent law
doctrine-a role they played prior to 1982. With the reintroduction of
varying regional circuit law on patent issues, the impedance for forum
306. See, e.g., Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 E2d 467, 469 (2d Cir.
1908).
307. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1360, 1375-
77 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
308. See, e.g., Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Electric Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.l 1
(11 th Cir. 1982) (referring specifically to the circuit's law regarding the presumption of valid-
ity).
309. See, e.g. Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2003).
310. See, e.g. id.; McCormick v. Dep't of Air Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
311. Poplawski, supra note 196, at 422.
312. See THOMAS BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL 15-17 (1994).
313. The Supremacy Clause requires state courts to apply federal law when hearing fed-
eral claims. See Howlett by Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-72 (1990); Nicole A. Gordon
& Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1145,1152 (1984).
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shopping will reintroduce itself. Potential infringers will purposely file
lawsuits that spark compulsory patent infringement counterclaims in
regional circuits that look unfavorably on patents and patentees.
Potential infringers may even file suits in state courts in order to deny the
responding patentee-defendant of having her patent law counterclaims
adjudicated in federal court. With the development of differing law will
come the filling of more suits that use the rule set forth in Holmes as a
forum shopping tool to avoid the Federal Circuit or federal court
altogether. The cycle then feeds back on itself, with more regional circuit
or state court cases will come further development of patent law outside
of the Federal Circuit review, which will lead to even more regional
circuit or state court cases as litigants attempt to exploit advantages that
present themselves from this case law developing outside the Federal
Circuit. The litigation of lawsuits outside the Federal Circuit's appellate
review as a result of Holmes in combination with regional circuit's
applying and developing their own patent law, independent of the
Federal Circuit, will lead to non-uniformity in patent law. This non-
uniformity created by the Holmes decision will manifest itself in two
areas-(a) an increase in doctrinal instability in patent law due to both
regional circuits and state courts handling of patent law claims and (b) a
lack of horizontal equity between the law applied during the patent
procurement process before the USPTO and the enforcement of patents
in different federal and state courts.
A. Holmes's Impact on Doctrinal Stability in Patent Law
The development of patent law under the regional circuits prior to
1982 was extremely uneven, with certain circuits adopting rules of law
excessively favorable to patentees while other circuits were just the op-
posite, adjudicating cases in favor of alleged infringers.34 The Supreme
Court was unable to provide some stability to the nationwide develop-
ment of patent law, mainly because of its overloaded docket and absence
in patent law jurisprudence.3"5 The Federal Circuit was created to intro-
duce some doctrinal stability into patent law.31 6 Congress choose a single
intermediate-level appellate court to review all patent cases to interject
certainty and predictability in the adjudication of patent claims."7 This
increase in certainty and predictability was to provide better guidance to
both investors in technology, both patentees and potential infringers, and
314. See supra notes 14-27.
315. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 2.
316. See supra note 31.
317. See id.
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administrative agencies that applied patent law, such as the USPTO.
38
Additionally, in the early to mid-1800s, federal courts were given exclu-
sive jurisdiction over patent cases to achieve similar goals. 3'9 This
exclusive handling of patent cases by the federal judiciary, rather than by
the states, promoted uniform decisions on patent law issues. 320 Allowing
a single tribunal, such as the Federal Circuit, or a single judicial body,
the federal court system, to be the main, if not only, player in the devel-
opment of a particular area of law ensures some level of stability in how
that law develops. Basically, "that forum [uses] its monopoly to inject
doctrinal stability into the law it administers. 32' And, while absolute doc-
trinal stability has certainly not been achieved,322 the Federal Circuit's
handling of patent appeals over the past twenty years has introduced
32doctrinal stability that was clearly absent before its creation.23 The same
can be said with respect to the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over
patent cases.
Holmes disrupts the Federal Circuit's and the federal courts' monop-
oly over patent law cases. Each of the twelve regional circuits can now
play a part in the development of patent law, returning the patent land-
scape to its pre-1982 form. Regional circuit law that conflicts on certain
patent law issues, noted supra, will immediately present instability once
cases are handled by regional circuits. Unless the Supreme Court can
318. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 6-7; Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, 94 F.R.D. 350, 359 (1982) (statements of Rep. Kastenmeier).
319. See Donald Shelby Chism, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Fed-
eral Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASHINGTON L. REV. 633, 635-36 (1971).
320. See id. at 636.
321. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 2.
322. Many commentators have spoken as of late on the lack of uniformity in Federal Cir-
cuit precedent. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must
Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 (Aug. 1999) (noting that
"[t]he problem most frequently mentioned by practitioners" as the source of the uncertainty of
the Federal Circuit's decision "is known as 'panel-dependency' "); Matthew F. Weil & William
C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis: The Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal
Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 791, 804-07 (Nov. 1998). Yet,
even with this uneven precedent, commentators recognize that the Federal Circuit still serves
the "fundamental reason for its creation ... namely, national uniformity in the application of
federal patent law." Poplawski, supra note 196. If the Federal Circuit creates non-uniformity,
that non-uniformity would be magnified if patent law claims were also handled by regional
circuits and state courts.
323. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Donald R. Dunner, Increasing Certainty in Patent
Litigation: The Need for Federal Circuit Approved Pattern Jury Instructions, 89 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 431,432 (June 2001) ("Though in a field of law as dynamic as patent
law there cannot be 100% assurance of the outcome of any case, business executives and their
counsel can now look to a much more coherent and consistent body of case law to guide their
fundamental research and development decisions."); Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Conflicts and the
Federal Circuit, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835, 835-36 (Summ. 1996) ("By nearly all ac-
counts, the Federal Circuit was successful in fulfilling the mandate of Congress" to establish
uniformity in patent law.).
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324hear enough patent law cases to bring stability to the patent law arena,
non-uniformity will go unchecked, and any certainty or predictability
Federal Circuit review created will be eroded. The handling of patent law
claims by courts in the fifty states expands the potential for fragmented
patent decisions and even more doctrinal instability.3" Conflicts amongst
the regional circuits, the Federal Circuit, and even state courts, will
emerge. Businesses and investors in technology, after Holmes, will need to
evaluate how all of the regional circuits and states handle patent law issues
in order to adequately determine the scope of a particular patent.
B. Holmes's Impact on Horizontal Equity in Patent Law
The introduction of the Federal Circuit has created horizontal eq-
uity326 in the patent law in two ways. First, the Federal Circuit has
insured that the same rule of law applies to those individuals proceeding
before the USPTO and those individuals in district court. Before the
Federal Circuit, appeals from the USPTO were handled by the CCPA
while appeals from enforcement actions in federal district court were
handled by the appropriate regional circuit.327 The Federal Circuit com-
bined the CCPA responsibility to review USPTO decisions with the
regional circuits' responsibility to review appeals from patent cases.328
With the creation of the Federal Circuit, the same appellate law governed
the USPTO and federal district court patent cases. The same rule of law
applied to a patent before the USPTO and a patent in federal court, creat-
ing a degree of horizontal equity. Second, the Federal Circuit also
introduced horizontal equity between federal district court cases. Re-
gardless of where a patent case was geographically filed, the patent
issues would be governed and reviewed by the same appellate court. Any
uniformity in patent law the Federal Circuit creates is enjoyed by "all
similarly situated parties-those engaged in patent-related activities."329
324. While there have been recent cases by the Supreme Court in the patent area, see,
e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); J.E.M. AG
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001), in general, the Supreme
Court has been "invisible" in the area of patent law during the first twenty years of the Federal
Circuit's existence. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme
Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. R. 387 (2001).
325. Commentators have also noted additional improprieties resulting from state courts
handling patent law claims. See Chism, supra note 320, at 663-64 (noting specifically that
state courts should not handle questions of patent validity).
326. "Horizontal equity," when referred to in this article, means the same or equal treat-
ment under the law for the same or similarly situated litigants. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note
14, at 8; Schaffner, supra note 300, at 1196.
327. See supra note 17.
328. See supra note 30.
329. See Schaffner, supra note 300, at 1196.
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Before the Federal Circuit's creation, regional circuit law caused some
geographic regions to be extremely pro-patentee, while others were anti-
patentee-creating horizontal inequalities.3
After Holmes, regional circuits and state courts play a larger role in
the development of patent law, hampering the Federal Circuit's ability to
create horizontal equity. A regional circuit will apply its own law to a
patent law claim, law that does not effect individuals before the PTO or
outside the regional circuit's geographical bounds. Furthermore, due to
Holmes, a patentee's claims may be handled by a state court-a com-
pletely different environment than federal court. It is no longer possible
that an individual patent will be governed by the same appellate law in
every case, particularly with the potential for the patent to be litigated in
state court. The lack of uniformity introduced by Holmes, with claims
being litigated in regional circuits or state courts, generates a situation
where it becomes even tougher for the same or similar result to be
reached under the same or similar facts in a patent case.
V. WAYS TO ENSURE UNIFORMITY IN
PATENT LAW AFTER HOLMES
A. Legislation
The Supreme Court's decision was controlled by the "arising under"
language in § 1338 and the fact that the Federal Circuit's appellate juris-
diction is based on a district court's jurisdiction."' A legislative solution,
amending the statutes at issue in Holmes, is the most direct approach to
negate the impact of the Supreme Court's decision. However, after one
looks at the two statutes involved, and their impact on both Federal Cir-
cuit and federal district court jurisdiction, returning patent law to its pre-
Holmes status is not that easy.
An initial way of negating the impact of Holmes is to change the
specific language that formed the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling-
the "arising under" language in § 1338(a). For example, the "arising un-
der" language in § 1338(a) could be removed and replaced with the
phrase "asserting a claim under," used in § 1338(b), so as to not trigger
the well-pleaded complaint rule. Section 1338(a) would read:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion [asserting a claim under] any Act of Congress relating to
patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.
330. See supra note 20.
331. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893-95.
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Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in
patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.
With this amendment, both appellate jurisdiction and removal juris-
diction over patent cases would no longer depend on the well-pleaded
complaint rule. Every patent law claim asserted, including counter-
claims, would confer jurisdiction, both for the Federal Circuit and
federal district courts. Such a change to § 1338(a) arguably creates too
broad of a result-giving district court's removal jurisdiction over copy-
right and trademark counterclaims. Amending § 1338(a) in this way
would dramatically shift the balance of forum choice in favor of the de-
fendants, allowing any defendant in state court to assert a patent,
copyright, or trademark counterclaim, compulsory or permissive, and
create removal jurisdiction. This manufactures the very situation that
worried the Supreme Court in Holmes.332
Another legislative solution would be to change § 1295(a)(1) reli-
ance on § 1338 when defining the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction. Section 1295(a)(1) could still refer to the district court's
jurisdiction, but do so explicitly within the statute, as opposed to through
reference to § 1338(a). In addition, when referring to the district court's
jurisdiction, the amendment would not use the specific "arising under"
language. Section 1295(a)(1) would read:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
have exclusive jurisdiction-(1) of an appeal from a final deci-
sion of a district court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction
of that court was based, in whole or in part, on s..t..n 1338o
this title, exccpt that a ease inivolying a elaimi arising under any
Aet of Congress rolating to copyrights, exelusive rights int mfask
works, or tradefmarks and nie other elaimns under seetiefn 1338(a)
shall be gov.....d by s tifos 1291, 129-2, and 1294 of this title
[any claim under any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant
variety protection].
This change, while still basing the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction on
that of the district courts but does not using "arising under" language,
makes counterclaims eligible to confer appellate jurisdiction. The
amendment also unties the scope of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
from the removal jurisdiction of the district court. By changing
§ 1295(a)(1) alone, the effects of Holmes on state court jurisdiction
would remain-with counterclaims not serving as a basis for removal
jurisdiction. Unlike the amendment to § 1338(a) discussed supra, this
332. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893-94.
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amendment still allows a plaintiff to control whether a case will stay in
state court or be removed to federal court. However, this amendment,
while ensuring that patent counterclaims filed in federal court are ap-
pealed to the Federal Circuit, does not ensure that patent law
counterclaims are adjudicated at the federal level. By only amending§ 1295(a)(1), the effect of Holmes on the exclusive federal jurisdiction
over patent and copyright counterclaims remains-state courts can still
maintain jurisdiction over such claims even after this amendment.
In order to perfect exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent law
claims, including those presented as counterclaims, § 1338(a) must be
amended. Such an amendment that is only concerned with the impact the
Supreme Court's interpretation of "arising under" on exclusive jurisdic-
tion would focus on the second sentence of § 1338(a), which defines the
scope of federal exclusive jurisdiction. An amendment could read:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant
variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. .ueh j isie
shall be x.lusiv [The district courts shall have exclusive juris-
diction] of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety
protection and copyright cases.
This amendment would confer federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over all patent and copyright claims, including counterclaims, while
preventing the creation of removal jurisdiction by the assertion of a patent
or copyright counterclaim.333 After such an amendment, patent law
counterclaims would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts, but could not make a state case removable. This legislative solution
attempts to balance the interests of federal courts adjudicating federal
claims, even if they are presented as counterclaims, while maintaining the
ability of a state court plaintiff to maintain control over the venue in which
her state claims are adjudicated.334
In light of the possible amendments discussed supra, there is not one
simple legislative solution that returns us to the pre-Holmes environment.
One simple amendment cannot both try to preserve patent law uniform-
ity and maintain a plaintiff's forum choice. The only legislative solution
that comes close is to combine the amendments of § 1295(a) described
333. The language of the amendment is based on the language used in both the admi-
ralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, and bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), statutes that confer the federal
district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over cases in those areas of law.
334. One problem this type of amendment presents is that both a federal and state court
may, in co-pending matters, be attempting to adjudicate claims based on the same factual
issues. A patent claim may be pending in federal district court that is part of the same transac-
tion or occurrence as state law claims before the state court. The exclusive federal jurisdiction,
combined with the lack of removal jurisdiction after Holmes, can create such a situation.
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above with the amendments of § 1338(a) targeted at the scope of exclu-
sive jurisdiction. An easy legislative answer is not available.
B. Regional Circuits'and State Courts'
Choice of Federal Circuit Law
Another potential method of preventing the non-uniformity likely to
result from Holmes is for regional circuits and state courts to adopt
choice of law rules that look to Federal Circuit law as controlling on pat-
ent issues. Under this approach, even if patent law counterclaims are
handled outside the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, Federal Circuit law
would still control the patent claims' resolution. Regional circuits and
state courts could look to the Federal Circuit's choice of law criteria ap-
plied to non-patent law issues for guidance. With regard to legal issues
that are outside of the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional mandate, the Fed-
eral Circuit's decision is controlled by the law of the regional circuit
from which the case was heard.335 Substantive law issues regarding non-
patent claims and procedural law issues that are not unique to patent law
are controlled by the appropriate regional circuit's jurisprudence. 336 If an
issue of law falling outside the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional mandate
has not been decided by the regional circuit, the Federal Circuit attempts
to "to determine how the circuit would likely resolve the issues., 3 7 The
Federal Circuit adopted these rules to avoid "encouragement of forum
shopping on non-patent claims and appropriation by th(e) court of ele-
ments of law not exclusively assigned to it.",
331
For the same reasons, regional circuits and state courts should apply
Federal Circuit law for all substantive patent law issues and procedural
law issues unique to patents.339 While there will still be differences be-
tween courts applications of law to fact in patent cases, adoption of these
choice of law rules would minimize forum shopping between venues.
Regardless of which regional circuit or state court hears the patent law
counterclaim, Federal Circuit law would still apply. In addition, applying
335. See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., No. 01-1108, -1109, 2002 WL 1917337,
6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2002); Atari, 747 F.2d at 1439-40.
336. See Atari, 747 F.2d at 1437-41 (holding that non-patent law issues are controlled
entirely by regional circuit law); Bandag, 750 F.2d at 909; Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedi-
cal, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 858-59 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that procedural law issues not unique
to patent law are governed by regional circuit law).
337. Indep. Serv. Organizations, 203 F.3d at 1328-29.
338. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1441; see also Schaffner, supra note 300, at 1189-91.
339. Presumably, regional circuits would need to go en banc to deviate from their own
precedent and adopt the Federal Circuit's case law on patent issue. See, e.g. Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207-08 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that the newly formed
Eleventh Circuit will be bound by Fifth Circuit law issued prior to the Fifth Circuit's split).
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Federal Circuit law is in line with congressional intent for the Federal
Circuit to provide uniformity in the patent area. Although not as com-
plete a solution as a legislative amendment, discussed supra, choice of
law rules that favor Federal Circuit law for patent issues would reduce
Holmes's potential impact on patent law uniformity.
C. Patentee's Procedural Solutions
Patentees may also employ some procedural theatrics of their own to
ensure that their patent claims do not get appealed to a regional circuit or
heard by a state court. As noted above, after Holmes, alleged infringers
may file non-patent suits that require patentees to assert their patent
claims as compulsory counterclaims. This forced filing of patent coun-
terclaims could occur in federal district court or state court. One
potential solution is for the patentee to, in addition to filing the compul-
sory counterclaim, file a complaint of its own in federal district court
asserting the compulsory patent law claims. This complaint will meet the
criteria established in Holmes, with a patent law claim presented in a
well-pleaded complaint.3 40 The appeal from the patentee filed case would
lie in the Federal Circuit.
Additionally, the patentee can attempt to consolidate its complaint
with the one filed by the alleged infringer. Under the current case law,
the complete consolidated case, including the non-patent complaint that
sparked the controversy, is appealed to the Federal Circuit.34' The pat-
entee could create a situation similar to that in Interpart and Innotron.42
In both cases, in response to non-patent complaints, the patentee filed
separate patent infringement cases which were later consolidated with
the non-patent complaints.3 3 In Innotron, in response to a claim asserting
antitrust violations, Abbot Laboratories filed compulsory patent law
counterclaims to the antitrust case as a complaint in the same district
court.' In both cases, the patent case was consolidated with the non-
patent case and the appeal from the entire consolidated case was found
to lie with the Federal Circuit.345 While the exact effect of the holding in
Holmes on consolidated cases is unclear, as discussed supra, the filing of
a separate case and, possibly, moving for consolidation with the non-
patent, but related, case may be worthwhile if the patentee wants its
claims heard by the Federal Circuit.
340. See Holmes, 122 S.Ct. at 1893-94.
341. See Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1079-81; Interpart, 777 F2d at 680-81.
342. See id.
343. Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1078-79; Interpart, 777 F.2d at 679-80.
344. Innotron, 800 F2d at 1078.
345. See Innotron, 800 F.2d at 1080-81; Interpart, 777 F.2d at 680-81.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Holmes opens the door for the de-
velopment of patent law outside of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. Any
uniformity in patent law created by the Federal Circuit could potentially
be undone by the Supreme Court's decision. Holmes puts both the doc-
trinal stability and horizontal equity in patent law Congress attempted to
introduce in 1982 in jeopardy. Without a legislative solution or regional
circuits and state courts following Federal Circuit law on patent issues,
uniformity in patent law may become even more difficult to achieve.
Finally, when looking at any potential solution, care must be taken to
both successfully remedy the problem created by Holmes and address
the concerns regarding broadening removal jurisdiction noted by the
Supreme Court.
